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                 Sustainable development has become an important lens through which environmental 
conservation is being viewed (Arrow et al., 1995; Dasgupta, 2013). For sustainable 
environmental conservation to be a plausible economic policy, Bromley (2005) argues that it has 
to address two realms: (1) how humans interact with nature (including how people value the 
environment) and (2) how interactions between humans affect their attitudes to nature (e.g., how 
social norms shape environmental valuation within a society). In order to address these two 
realms in economic policy, it is crucial to understand the interactions of people with nature as 
well as with each other with respect to nature with help of economic mechanisms.  
However, design and implementation of mechanisms to understand these two realms are 
not always straightforward. For instance, in relation to the first realm, i.e. understanding people‘s 
valuation of environmental goods, it is clear that valuation depends on the type of environmental 
services (use vs. non-use value) under consideration (Assessment, 2005; Freeman III, Herriges, 
& Kling, 2014). In the case of use values such as provisioning services and cultural services of 
environmental goods, usually, there are markets. For example, people have to decide how much 
to pay for clean water or to receive recreational services. For non-use values such as bequest and 
existence values, there are no naturally occurring markets as these services are non-excludable 
and non-rival in nature. However, valuation techniques (like the Contingent Valuation Method) 
have been developed to address the first realm. Similarly, scrutinizing the second realm requires 
an understanding of social norms that may shape the valuation of environmental good in the 
community. In relation to this, there are numerous studies on the relationship of social norms 
with the decision to cooperate in the domain of public good provision – the second realm  
(Bouma, Bulte, & van Soest, 2008; Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004). However, to what extent such 





 This thesis has two main themes. The first main theme is examining the design and 
implementation of two different valuation mechanisms to deepen the understanding of the first 
realm. As noted earlier, in the absence of conventional markets for non-use value of 
environmental goods, it is not possible to trace the value placed on them. One way of 
overcoming this problem is designing valuation mechanisms in the form of artificial markets. 
The so-called Contingent Valuation Method (CVM) was designed to do that and is the most 
widely applied method in the literature of valuation (Carson & Czajkowski, 2014; Haab, Interis, 
Petrolia, & Whitehead, 2013; Hanemann, 1994; Oerlemans, Chan, & Volschenk, 2016). 
Accounting for these values through creating artificial market has indeed affected policies (even 
when stakes are high) by bringing to attention the different services an environment provides to a 
society (see Carson et al., 2013). While the application of CVM may improve environmental 
policy by accounting for non-use values, critics of the CVM have argued that the preferences 
measured under CVM are not correlated with the value that people attach to the good (Hausman, 
2012). Given that CVM is the most widely used mechanism in the market for mentioned 
valuation, there is a need to deepen the understanding of its application while simultaneously 
aiming to improve of the mechanism (Oerlemans et al., 2016).  
 In chapter 2 I examine how variations in information and context affect the outcomes of 
a valuation exercise. Stated preferences for environmental goods are assumed to be independent 
of the process via which these environmental outcomes have been produced. Contrary to this 
assumption, however, empirical findings by Bulte, Gerking, List, and de Zeeuw (2005) show that 
not only outcomes matter in valuation, but also what mechanisms gave rise to the environmental 
outcome. In case of environmental degradation, people‘s valuation of a policy to improve 
outcomes is found to depend on what factor caused the degradation – nature, or mankind. In this 
thesis, I extend the work of  Bulte et al. (2005) as follows. Using a field experiment I test 
whether drawing people‘s attention to the role they play in the process of environmental 
degradation affects their willingness to pay for mitigation, and how this compares to the 
activities undertaken by others.  I do so by eliciting contributions to a reforestation program in an 
environmentally valuable area in Ethiopia. I implement three different conditions which allow 
me to measure the impact on contributions emphasizing (i) the contributions of others to forest 
conservation, and (ii) the role of the respondents themselves in the forest degradation process. I 





respondents‘ negative role in the process actually increases contributions. Extant literature notes 
that including information on human-caused environmental damage in contingent valuation 
surveys does indeed increases the WTP values. This was, however, attributed to ‗outrage effect‘ 
– that is, because respondents are upset, they contribute more to environmental goods. In a 
somewhat different setting this study finds evidence that people‘s contributions also increase 
significantly and substantially if attention is drawn to their own responsibility in the 
deforestation and desertification process, suggesting, the ‗responsibility effect‘ is also important 
in valuation. 
Chapter 3 also sheds light on the first realm as it revisits Payment for Ecosystem Services 
(PES). PES is a recent mechanism that enables the purchase of eco-system services from willing 
service providers (Wunder, 2012). One of the main challenges in the design of PES schemes is 
how to determine the optimal price to offer. With high prices many private land owners are 
willing to participate in the PES scheme, but the budget will run out sooner too. Few studies 
(Berry, Fischer, & Guiteras, 2015; Jack, 2013), have compared several pricing policy 
mechanisms that are theoretically similar. Both of these studies found divergence in performance 
of the pricing mechanisms when implemented in the field (Berry et al., 2015, p. 14; Jack, 2013, 
p. 120), pointing out the need for further investigation concerning the causes of such divergence. 
This chapter builds on Kelsey Jack‘s (2013) study to test whether incentive-compatible valuation 
mechanisms – more specifically so-called Uniform Price Auctions (UPA) – are able to predict 
uptake in the field. We replicate Jack‘s results that UPA outcomes are a poor predictor of actual 
participation rates, and find suggestive evidence that the difference in actual and predicted take-
up rates is due to more deliberate decision making in UPA than with take-it-or-leave-it offers. 
We subsequently design and conduct a laboratory experiment to further test this hypothesis. A 
field experiment was conducted on tree planting projects to test the above hypothesis (with 
Ghanaian farmers), and a lab experiment was implemented with European students who were 
endowed with chocolate bars (with unique feature). Using both lab and field experiments, it is 
found that given the same level of price, the sign-up rate differs between the two mechanisms. 
More subjects are willing to sign-up in TILI than was predicted in UPA. Our findings also 
suggest that this disparity can be explained by the hypothesis of more deliberate decision making 
in UPA than TILI. The argument is that decision making under TILI is not explained by the key 





the subjects whereas these variables seem to be important in decision making under UPA. In the 
same way, the time taken to make a decisions varies between the two mechanisms; that more 
time of reflection is taken in uniform price auction than TILI.  This further supports the 
hypothesis of less deliberate decision making in TILI, but not in UPA. Even though decision 
making under TILI is relatively less complicated, there is a need for careful selection of 
implementation schemes. Hence, policymakers have to make a trade-off between simplicity and 
efficiency when deciding on the mechanism they want to implement. 
                 As the second main theme of this thesis, the emphasis is shifted to understanding the 
human interaction with each other with respect to own actions of environmental conservation. 
Ostrom (1991) suggests that engaging local community in the conservation can be; (i) cheaper 
than top-down management style, and (ii) feasible to overcome the tragedy of the commons. 
More interestingly, people‘s interaction with each other might evolve depending on their 
contribution to environmental conservation, if the proper social institution that supports such 
conservation actions is in place. Even though this line of thinking suggests social norms as a 
strong instrument in common good conservation, the role of these norms in ensuring sustainable 
conservation behavior is debatable from a standard economic theory point of view (see Hardin, 
1978, 1979; Olson, 2009). 
Hence, it is crucial to examine how certain norms such as fairness, trust, and 
trustworthiness evolve in the community (engaged in conservation) to predict the sustainability 
of common good conservation. Thus, chapter 4 of the thesis deals with trust and trustworthiness, 
as important social norms, between the cooperators and non- cooperator in common good 
conservation. The empirical examples of the community contributing to public goods, contrary to 
the predictions of the standard economic theory (zero contribution) are numerous (Bouma et al., 
2008; Narloch, Pascual, & Drucker, 2012; Pagiola & Rios, 2013; Papacostas, 2014). In the 
literature, this is often explained by the existence of conditional cooperators in the population, in 
addition to the selfish agents among others. These conditional cooperators tend to initiate 
collective actions, trust more and are more trustworthy-behavior that diverge from standard 
economic prediction (Algan & Cahuc, 2010; Andreoni & Samuelson, 2006; Fehr & Schmidt, 
1999; Fischbacher, Gächter, & Fehr, 2001; Knack, 2001).  Following the disparity of behavior 
from the prediction of the standard economic theory, Ostrom (2014) proposed the revised theory 





of different types of agents in the economy). This theory assumes that players receive objective 
payoff but the decisions are based on the alteration of the objective payoff into intrinsic value 
(Güth & Yaari, 1992). Moreover, under full information about the types of agents (say in a trust 
game), the conditional cooperators will consistently receive a higher payoff whereas, the selfish 
agents will receive consistently lower payoff since no one will trust them (Ostrom, 1991). Hence, 
only the cooperators will survive with the complete information process as selfish agents are 
discriminated (selected) against (Ostrom, 2000). Social identity theory, on the other hand, 
predicts a different result as far as in-group and out-group discrimination is concerned (Tajfel, 
1974). The prediction of this theory is that group members will have more affinity towards their 
fellow group members over non-members. The two theories, seem to predict two different 
results. The former theory predicts that all types favor the cooperator type, while the latter theory 
predicts each group has more affinity towards the fellow member (same type). Here, I examine 
the case of collaborative forest management (CFM), as it is often called, which is advocated 
because of its ability to engage the grass root stakeholders in the conservation. I conducted an 
incentivized field experiment with a slightly modified standard trust game (Berg, Dickhaut, & 
McCabe, 1995). The results of the experiment indicate that (i) both CFM members and non-CFM 
members send more money to CFM members than to non-CFM members, and (ii) the non-CFM 
members, in general, send more money than the CFM members. The difference is mainly caused 
by the behavior of CFM members towards non-CFM members. In a similar way, the CFM and 
non-CFM behaved differently with respect to the amount returned. The average share returned 
by CFM members is lower than the share returned by non-CFM members, which is again as the 
result of the lower amount returned to non-CFM by CFM members. These findings suggest the 
difference in the decisions made is driven by both with whom the player is matched and the 
identity of the player itself, i.e. whether the player belongs to the CFM group. This result 
supports the hypothesis that high trust is placed on the CFM since CFM members are viewed as 
more trustworthy than non-CFM members. Therefore, the CFM type receives more money, but 
return less (particularly to the non-CFM). This allows them to receive consistently higher pay 
off. Hence, at first it seems that there is some kind of paradox. CFM members may trust non-
CFM members less (and thus send less), but in fact, the non-CFM are more trustworthy (return 
more).  The findings of this experiment  support the hypothesis that higher trust is placed on the 





money, but sends and returns less to non-cooperators which allow the cooperator type to receive 
consistently higher payoff. 
In general, this dissertation deals with different methods of forest conservation and 
contributes to the understanding of designing appropriate mechanisms. It addresses, in particular, 
the conditions that influence the functioning of these various conservation mechanisms. It should 
be noted that the third chapter is the result of collaborative research efforts with other co-authors. 
As such, the paper is formulated in the first person plural (i.e. ―we‖) rather than first person 





















On the valuation of the causes and consequences of 





 One of the key assumptions of standard economic theory is that agents attach value to 
(economic) outcomes, and not to the process by which the outcomes are generated (Sen, 1995). 
If this were the case, people‘s willingness to financially contribute to the development of a cure 
for brain damage would be the same independent of whether accidents or excessive drinking are 
the main cause of the brain damage. Similar considerations would apply to the appreciation 
and/or provision of public goods as well – for example, whether the demise of a seal population 
is due to a natural disease or the consequence of fossil fuel extraction at sea, people‘s willingness 
to pay for a seal regeneration project should be the same. In fact, Bulte et al. (2005) find that 
people‘s willingness to pay (WTP) for a seal population recovery program is indeed higher when 
the demise of the species is due to human activity. They attribute this difference to a mechanism 
labeled as ―outrage effect‖, a term first coined by Kahneman, Ritov, Jacowitz, and Grant (1993) 
— people are more upset if they think the damage to the environment is caused by human 
activities they are not directly engaged in themselves.  
 In this paper, I extend the work by Bulte et al. (2005) by addressing the question of 
whether people‘s willingness to pay for protecting the environment is also higher if not other 
humans but they themselves are at least partly responsible for the current (degraded) state of the 
environment. More specifically, I analyze whether people are more willing to contribute to an 
environmental good if their own role in the environmental degradation process is emphasized. I 





valuable area, the Bale Eco-region in Ethiopia, by emphasizing that one of the activities that they 
engage in, logging, is one of the main causes of local forest loss.  
 Research on people‘s preferences and environmental valuations is often difficult 
because there is no direct relationship between people‘s preferences and their environmental 
behavior – people may have a strong preference for the environment but still decide not to 
undertake environmentally friendly actions. The difference between preferences and behavior 
may be the result of the environment being a public good. An individual engaging in 
environmentally friendly behavior incurs costs while her private benefits of the improved 
environmental outcome are typically small. Revealed preference techniques may thus not always 
be applicable, but unfortunately, survey methods to elicit valuation, the so-called stated 
preferences techniques, are not without problems either. Hypothetical bias is one of the most 
important problems with stated preferences valuation techniques. If asked to value an item, 
people tend to overstate their true willingness to pay if they think that they will not actually be 
forced to financially contribute.  
 To mitigate this issue, I decided to financially incentivize farmers‘ decision by (i) 
endowing them with a budget that is, in principle, theirs to keep, and (ii) subsequently asking 
them how much of their budget they are willing to invest in a local reforestation project. Asking 
farmers for their financial contribution implies that farmers will think carefully about their 
decision of how much to contribute. Step (ii) is implemented under three different conditions 
(using a between-subjects design). The first condition is one in which respondents receive a full 
account regarding forest-related activities. The scenario in this condition provides information on 
the efforts of other countries in the region to protect the forest, and it also emphasizes the fact 
that small-scale logging is one of the main causes of local forest degradation. Information on the 
effort other countries undertake to protect the forest is left out in the scenario of the second 
condition. The difference in contributions between the first and the second condition allows me 
to infer whether efforts by others tend to result in a higher propensity to contribute (as the good 
example by others crowds in contributions) or whether this tends to invite more free-riding (as 
the perceived necessity to contribute oneself too may be lower if others already engage in forest 
conservation activities). Compared to that of the first condition, the scenario in the third 





forest loss which, in turn, causes desertification in the region. Comparing the outcomes of the 
first and the third condition allows me to infer whether an increased emphasis on one‘s own 
personal role in the environmental degradation process tends to result in higher contributions, or 
not. I find that emphasizing the role of others does not affect contributions, while explicitly 
pointing out the (negative) role the respondents play actually increases contributions.  
 Asking respondents to make actual contributions in a public good setting induces 
respondents to think more carefully about the problem they are confronted with, but it does so at 
the expense of underestimating the farmers‘ true valuation of the forest. After all, the costs of 
contributing are private while the benefits accrue to all, and hence true willingness to pay (for 
example elicited in a binding referendum format) will likely be higher than observed willingness 
to pay. However, under the plausible assumption that the extent to which hypothetical versus 
factual payments affect farmers‘ WTP levels is the same in all three conditions, my study 
provides a careful test of the ―responsibility effect‖ on willingness to pay – the fact that I find 
differences in farmers‘ contributions between the various treatment arms indicates that also the 
farmers‘ true valuation will vary between the three treatment arms.  
 The setup of my paper is as follows. In section 2, I discuss the issue of hypothetical bias 
in stated preference valuation techniques, and how I dealt with this issue in this study. In section 
3, I present the study‘s hypotheses and experimental design. Section 4 includes the results of the 
experiment and further analysis using different tools. Finally, section 5 presents the conclusions.  
2.2. Valuation of Environmental Goods and Services 
 Environmental valuation is an important issue as the quantity and quality of nature and 
the environment directly affect people‘s welfare – and especially the welfare of those people who 
are directly dependent on these natural resources (Dean & Hoeller, 1991). Nevertheless, 
environmental valuation is not straightforward owing to the typical nature of the public goods. 
Pure public goods have two characteristics. First, they are non-excludable – people cannot be 
excluded from the benefits these goods provide, not even if they themselves did not contribute to 
their provision. And second, their consumption is non-rival – one person‘s consumption of the 
public good does not affect the extent to which others can benefit from it. Markets can provide 





and non-rivalry in consumption implies that there are no naturally occurring markets for public 
goods (Carson, Flores, & Meade, 2001). Artificial markets for public goods, however, can be 
developed by using different valuation methods. 
 One such valuation method is the contingent valuation method (CVM), which was 
developed by Ciriacy-Wantrup (1947). CVM is, in essence, a survey method in which the 
respondent is provided with a description of a hypothetical public good provision program, like a 
bird protection project or an oil spill prevention program. The respondents are given detailed 
information on the benefits that the program will provide – the type of birds targeted, how they 
look like, their importance for maintaining the integrity of the ecosystem, etc. The scenario also 
specifies the increase in population size (or prevention of their decline) the program is expected 
to realize. After having provided this information, the respondent‘s valuation of the project is 
elicited – either by simply asking what the maximum amount of money is that she is willing to 
pay for the project to be implemented (so-called ―open-ended bid elicitation‖), or by asking the 
respondent whether she would be willing to pay a specific amount of money for the project‘s 
implementation yes or no. The second type of question is often framed as a referendum (―if the 
project would require the imposition of a tax of $x, would you vote in favor of the project, yes or 
no?‖) and is typically referred to as the dichotomous choice valuation approach (Adamowicz, 
Boxall, Williams, & Louviere, 1998; Mitchell & Carson, 1989). The demand function for the 
public good is then obtained by varying the amount to be paid – the higher the amount stated the 
lower the share of respondents who indicate that they would be willing to pay that amount. 
 Since its first application (Robert, 1963), the dichotomous choice valuation technique 
has become increasingly more popular (compared to the open-ended valuation approach); see 
(Freeman III et al., 2014; Haab et al., 2013; Oerlemans et al., 2016). The reason is that 
theoretically, the dichotomous choice approach is incentive compatible, in the sense that there is 
little reason to strategically misrepresent one‘s preferences (by saying ―yes‖ to a price offer that 
is above one‘s true value or ―no‖ to an offer that is below one‘s true value). This is not 
necessarily the case in the open-ended versions, where respondents may strategically (grossly) 
under- or overstate their willingness to pay depending on whether they think that they will 
actually be forced to contribute the stated amount, or not implementation (Cummings, Elliott, 





 However, despite the mentioned advantage of dichotomous choice mechanism, 
experimental studies have found some unresolved issues with the mechanism. One issue is a 
disparity in valuation results between the hypothetical referendum and the real referendum 
(Cummings & Taylor, 1999; J. A. Hausman, 2012). It is often the case that in CV, the WTP 
elicited tend to be higher than in situations where the yes/no question has real consequences 
(with all respondents being forced to pay and the project being implemented if the majority votes 
in favor). Two of the main causes for this upward bias is that the hypothetical nature of the 
method invites socially desirable answers, while respondents may also fail to pay enough 
attention to the budget consequences of their answer (if the project had not been hypothetical). 
To address this issue, I decided to financially incentivize farmers‘ decision to contribute 
to the public good – a reforestation project in their local forest. Whereas this decreases the 
farmers‘ propensity to provide socially desirable answers, it does so at the cost of 
underestimating their true willingness to pay. This can be seen as follows.  
Let    denote community member‘s contribution to the reforestation project – the number 
of trees she decides to have planted on her behalf. If there are n community members, the 
number of trees planted is   ∑   
 
     From the community‘s perspective there are local 
benefits to having more trees. Let us denote the local benefits accruing to community member i 
(improved soil protection, improved retaining of groundwater, etc.) with      . Denoting 
community member i‘s budget for tree planting with    and the (constant) costs of financing 
planting a tree with     community member i‘s welfare associated with planting Q trees is equal 
to 
              ∑   
 
                                    (1) 
and the social welfare consequence of the community planting    ∑   
 
     trees is  
  ∑   
 
    ∑          
 
    ∑   
 
    ∑   
 
                                 (2) 
Maximizing (2), the socially optimal number of trees planted by each community member is 
implicitly defined by 
  
   
     ∑   
  





But if a community member does not attach any value to the benefits of planting trees accruing 
to his/her fellow community members, he/she maximizes (1), and hence his/her privately optimal 
number of trees planted is 
   
   
       
                                                                                                 (4) 
Comparing (3) and (4) and noting that  ∑   
  
      
  ∑   
    
 
   , it is clear that the privately 
optimal number of trees planted is smaller than the socially optimal number. 
 For this study, we financially incentivize community members to choose how many 
trees should be planted on their behalf. Unless all community members are pure altruists, our 
estimates of the marginal social value of trees are anywhere between   
  and ∑   
  
   , and hence 
may be a gross /underestimate of the (true) social value. With this approach, we trade off the 
benefits of a well thought-through financially incentivized decision at the cost of underestimating 
the true value. However, as we are interested in the treatment differences rather than in the levels 
themselves, we choose to financially incentivize private decision-making. Therefore, we do not 
estimate the true social value of trees. But we argue that if the framing affects the private 
decisions in a specific way, the social values are likely to vary similarly. 
2.3. Context and Hypotheses 
 I hypothesize that the information about the efforts taken by others to promote forest 
conservation and reduce desertification will not affect respondents‘ valuation of conservation 
activities (and also not their contributions), but that reminding them of their own role in the 
deforestation process will result in increased contributions. Previous studies have found that 
including the human-caused environmental damage information will increase WTP (Bulte et al., 
2005) and (Carson et al., 2003). More specifically, Bulte et al. (2005) studied how different 
causes of environmental degradation (human vs. natural) affect WTP values. They found that 
people state a higher WTP when the cause of environmental damage is human activity. They 
attributed this difference to an ―outrage effect‖ –people contribute more if they think the damage 
to the environment is caused by human activity because this makes them feel upset. 





if they think they themselves are (partly) responsible for the observed degradation (Brown, 
Peterson, Marc Brodersen, Ford, & Bell, 2005; Walker, Morera, Vining, & Orland, 1999).  
 In this chapter, I test whether such a ―responsibility effect‖ also exists among farmers in 
Ethiopia‘s Bale Eco-region (see below for more information). I do so using a financially-
incentivized experiment that elicited WTP for a public good, afforestation. Decisions thus have 
real financial contributions. Respondents receive an endowment of 50 ETB (which is only 
slightly less than a full day‘s wage for unskilled labor). Respondents can pocket the money, but 
they can also spend it purchasing trees. Any tree purchased will be planted on their behalf. 
Having a tree planted on one‘s behalf costs10 ETB. The contribution decision is about the 
number of trees planted on one‘s behalf – any integer number between 0 and 5 trees. WTP thus 
takes six discrete values (0, 10, 20, 30, 40, and 50). I use a between-subjects design, and hence 
participants make a decision of how much to contribute in one of the three scenarios.  
 All scenarios (treatments) present the same information on the background about the 
importance of environmental good provision (deforestation and desertification), the good 
provided (afforestation), the mode of payment and budget constraint, and finally, the question of 
WTP elicitation. Hence, all the surveys have the same background, good, and payment 
mechanism but differ in the information used as treatments in the experiment. The three 
treatments are the following. The baseline treatment offers a scenario that, in addition to the 
information above, describes the efforts that neighboring countries are undertaking to prevent the 
problem, and it also explicitly draws attention to the role logging plays in the process of 
desertification and forest loss. Our respondents are small-scale farmers who engage in logging 
activities, and hence this scenario reminds them of their own responsibility in the process as well 
as of the activities of others to mitigate the problem. I call this the combined treatment. 
Compared to this first scenario, the second treatment condition omits the information about the 
respondents‘ own responsibility, and hence only provides information on the conservation efforts 
by others. I call this treatment the effort elsewhere only treatment. Compared to the scenario in 
the first treatment, the third condition omits the effort elsewhere content and hence provides only 
the information on the role of logging in the deforestation and desertification process. I call this 
scenario the human-caused treatment. Comparing contributions in the first and the second 





or crowds out contributions by our respondents. And comparing contributions in the first and the 
third treatment isolates the ―responsibility effect‖.  
 The scripts are as follows. The general information on the deforestation was as follows: 
 
“Desertification is the advance of deserts because the tree and plant cover that bind the 
soil is removed. It occurs when trees and bushes are stripped away for fuelwood and 
timber, or to clear land for cultivation. Desertification is a global issue, with serious 
implications worldwide for nature, wildlife, and agriculture. Some 50 million people in 
Ethiopia may be displaced within the next 10 years as a result of desertification.” 
 
And the willingness to pay question was framed as follows: 
“One effective mitigating measure is planting trees to change the non-forest land to 
forest and prevent deserts from expanding. 
Consider the benefits of planting trees in this region. Of the 50Birr you just received, how 
much do you wish to contribute to planting trees? For every 10Birr, we can plant 1 tree.  
I am willing to contribute ______ birr.” 
 
The script regarding the role of small-scale logging activities was as follows: 
“There are different factors that are increasing deforestation. One important factor is 
illegal logging by different parties. The uncontrolled cutting of trees will eventually 
change the forest land to non-forest land. This will aid the gradual changing of the land 
to desert and to an unfavorable climate. The trees that are cut down by illegal loggers 
are used as fuel for cooking as well as being sold in the market to be used for furniture 






This script was included in the human-caused only and in the combined treatments, but not in the 
effort elsewhere only treatment. 
 The script regarding the efforts of other countries to prevent deforestation and 
desertification was as follows: 
“Tanzania, Kenya, and Uganda have united their efforts to combat illegal timber trade in 
East Africa to decrease deforestation. These countries recognize that illegal logging must 
be mitigated and forests managed sustainably, in order to reduce emissions from forest 
loss. As such, a key goal of the initiative is to curb illegal logging and trade in East 
Africa as a way to address deforestation and subsequently reduce emissions from forests. 
Even though there are many international initiatives to curb deforestation, recent reports 
show that global efforts to curb deforestation are insufficient, as forests are cleared 
faster than ever for agribusiness, timber, and other land development schemes. However, 
there was an important call made for a change in policy to deal with the problem.”  
This script was included in the effort-elsewhere and in the combined treatments, but not in the 
human-caused only treatment. 
I now explicitly state the hypotheses that will be tested in this study: 
Hypothesis 1: Drawing respondents‘ attention to the role of illegal logging in the process of 
deforestation and desertification increases their contributions to the reforestation project offered. 
Average contributions are higher in the combined treatment than in the effort elsewhere only 
treatment. 
Hypothesis 2: Informing respondents that other countries recognize the role of illegal logging 
and actively try to discourage it induces respondents to raise their contributions to the 
reforestation project. Average contributions are higher in the combined treatment than in the 






2.4. Field, Randomization, Recruitment, and Experimental Procedure 
The context of the study is the Bale Mountains Eco-region in Ethiopia. The Bale 
Mountains Eco-region is the second largest standing moist tropical forest in Ethiopia (Defries et 
al., 2002). The Afro-alpine region provides habitat for numerous endemic species, marking the 
region as one of the 34 globally recognized biodiversity hotspots (Williams et al., 2005). More 
than 12 million people depend on the water that originates from the mountains. The dry lowlands 
of the east and southeast of Ethiopia (including neighboring Somalia and parts of Northern 
Kenya) get their perennial water only from water that springs from the mountains in the Eco-
region. This region was selected as a study area for three reasons. First, it is of considerable 
economic importance for Ethiopia –its direct consumptive use value alone was estimated to be in 
billions of dollars per year (Watson, 2007). Second, it is a priority forest area selected for 
conservation, in light of its importance for neighboring countries and the surrounding 
communities. Finally, it covers the largest area of Afro-alpine forests in the African continent 
(100,000ha) and is registered as a world heritage area by UNESCO. 
The sample in this study is taken from Dodola ―Woreda‖ (the lower administration level 
next to regional administration), out of which three villages were selected: Bura-Adelle, 
Kechema, and Geneta (see Figure 1). These villages were selected because they were among the 
first to implement forest management in the Bale Eco-region, and they are more accessible in 






Figure 2.1: Map of the study area. 
 The experiment was implemented in January 2016 in the three villages. Every treatment 
was implemented in each of the three villages, and respondents participated in just one treatment. 
In total 96 individuals participated in this study. The subjects were invited via the village-level 
administration agents to come to the meeting places. Inviting subjects to the meeting via village 
administration agents is not unusual in the study area. Village-level meetings are a common 
occurrence in which various issues are discussed on a regular basis. Hence, it is unlikely that the 





recruit certain types of individuals only.
1
 Hence, the subjects in this study are likely to be a fairly 
representative sample of the people living in the three villages.  
 Upon arrival of the subjects to the meeting place, the experimenters gave a brief 
explanation of the research project and the researcher‘s background. Next, subjects undertook 
two tasks in the field. The first task was filling out a general survey which was administered to 
collect the background information on the subjects. Experimenters collected this information 
individually from the subjects in the form of an interview.  
 The second task was the implementation of the WTP elicitation experiment. Subjects 
were assigned to one of three treatment groups. Note that the within-village treatment allocation 
helps mitigate concerns of unobserved heterogeneity affecting treatment outcomes. Next, 
research assistants read out the script aloud to each treatment group. Reading of scripts to each 
treatment group was done such that participants in the one group were not able to overhear what 
was being said in another group. Furthermore, the subjects made the decision individually after 
being approached by the experimenters in the form of an interview. Finally, based on their 
decision the money was immediately collected, and the trees were planted seven months later, 
i.e. July 2016).  
2.5. Results  
2.5.1. Sample and Descriptive Statistics 
 Table 2.1 shows the summary statistics of responder characteristics in the three 
treatments, as well as the outcomes of the relevant balance tests. The subject pools are found to 
differ in some respects. In the combined treatment the share of male participants is lower than in 
the other two treatments. However, it should be noted that differences in female participants 
across treatments are small in magnitude. For example, the third treatment group contains only 3 
women more compared to the other two treatments. Similarly, the membership in local 
collaborative forest management (CFM) groups differ somewhat across the treatments. The 
subjects of this experiment are also people who care about the environment and take the 
                                                            
1 This is also because, given that the government already initiated a ―5 households in one group‖ 
culture of working together, information disseminates very fast. Thus, it is less probable that 
certain households would be systematically sent to attend a meeting and others excluded, as this 





seriousness of environmental degradation into consideration. This opinion does not differ across 
treatments, as can be seen from the variable Opinion on climate change.  
Table 2.1. Participants’ characteristics by treatment group 
 Human-caused only Effort elsewhere only Combination p-value  
Income 3506.284 3504.650 3807.793 0.899 
  (423.767) (529.497) (547.556)  
Land Size 2.268 2.581 2.544 0.674 
  (0.293) (0.252) (0.273)  
Age (>25) 1.000 0.947 1.000 0.215 
  (0.000) (0.037) (0.000)  
Education (1-5) 0.677 0.447 0.519 0.159 
  (0.085) (0.082) (0.098)  
Family size (>5) 0.742 0.658 0.667 0.734 
  (0.080) (0.078) (0.092)  
Male 0.935 0.974 0.778 0.022 
  (0.045) (0.026) (0.082)  
CFM member 0.774 0.526 0.667 0.099 
  (0.076) (0.082) (0.092)  









N 31 38 27  
Standard errors in parentheses. Orthogonality outcomes are based on F-tests on the variable distributions 






2.5.2. Experimental Results 
 Table 2.2 presents the mean contribution (or WTP) as well as results of pairwise comparison 
tests of the mean contributions across the three treatment groups. Subjects in the human-caused 
only treatment have the highest mean WTP value (19.03ETB), while those in effort-elsewhere 
treatment have the lowest mean WTP value of 10.78ETB. The mean WTP value of combination 
treatment is 18.14ETB.  
Table 2.2. WTP by treatment group 












Human-caused only vs. Combined 0.457 
Effort-elsewhere 10.78 
(6.27) 
Effort-elsewhere vs. Combination  0.0041 
Standard deviation in parentheses. 
 The Kruskal-Wallis overall difference test indicates a statistically significant difference 
between the three treatment groups (p = 0.0097). The difference in means across treatments is 
tested using Mann-Whitney U tests. I find that mean contributions are significantly lower in the 
effort elsewhere only treatment than in the combined treatment (p = 0.0041). I thus find support 
for Hypothesis 1: compared to just being informed of efforts undertaken in other countries, 
additional information on the role of illegal logging in the region results in a significant and 
substantial increase in contributions. Next, contributions are not significantly affected by 
information on the efforts of neighboring countries to combat the problem. Average 





not significantly so, as the p-value is 0.457). This suggests that, if anything, information on 
efforts elsewhere tend to crowd out (rather than crowd in) contributions, which is not in line with 
Hypothesis 2. 
 The distribution of WTP across the treatment groups can be seen from Figure 2.2, which 
presents the histograms of WTP by treatment and for all treatments together (Figure 2.2d). As 
noted before, the WTP is a discrete variable taking values within the range of 0 to 50 ETB, with 
step size 10. The overall distribution of subjects‘ WTP shows a right-skewed distribution (Figure 
1d) similar to other WTP studies (Green, Jacowitz, Kahneman, & McFadden, 1998; Gunatilake 
& Tachiri, 2014; Kanninen, 2007; Martín-Fernández et al., 2014). Some participants have WTPs 
below 10 ETB (including zero). The majority of subjects‘ WTP values lie within the interval 
between 10 and 20 ETB. The distribution of WTP values, however, differs across the treatment 
groups.  
Figure 2.2. Histograms of WTPs by Treatment.
 
 
 In human-caused only treatment (panel a), the WTP shows more variation across the 
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skewed. On the other hand, the distribution of WTP values in the effort-elsewhere only treatment 
is less varied. The shape of the WTP distribution in this treatment is quite unimodal. Hence, the 
WTP of most participants in this treatment is very close to the others (about 60 percent have a 
WTP value of 10ETB). Finally, the distribution in the combination treatment indicates some 
variation. About 50 percent of subjects have WTP within the range of 10 to 20 ETB, with a 
positive distribution. In general, the histograms suggest that the WTP values vary more in the 
human-caused only treatment and the combination treatment compared to the treatment of effort-
elsewhere only. 
2.5.3. Econometric Analysis 
 The observed treatment differences are also explored using regression analysis, which 
allows for conditioning on covariates, in order to control for concerns about the impact of 
possible differences in the subject pools. Utilizing regression will furthermore help us test the 
construct validity of our CV surveys. To take into consideration the discrete nature of the 
dependent variable, the model is estimated using interval as well as ordered probit regression 
techniques. The ordered probit regression in this study serves as a robustness check given the 
weak normality of the dependent variable (revealed by the Shapiro-Wilk test), which is assumed 
by interval regression. The regression equation is specified by equation (5):  
 
WTPij = β0  + β1 TrHumanCauseOnlyij+ β2 EffortElsewhereOnlyij  + β3 Xij  + εij.  (5) 
 
 WTP values are regressed on treatment variables to extract treatment effects on 
individual i in village j, which are (β1, β2). β0  captures the average contribution in the 
combination treatment – the omitted category. The baseline treatment in our case is the effort-
elsewhere only treatment. Finally, β3 captures the subject-specific characteristics, such as the 
subjects‘ age, educational status, gender, income, land size, family size, and membership of 
environmental conservation groups. 
 Table 2.3 shows the factors that influence contributions to the reforestation project. All 
specifications include village fixed effects. The omitted category of the treatment indicators is 
the combined treatment; the coefficients on human-caused only and effort elsewhere only 





responsibility‖ information, respectively. Columns 1 and 2 of the table indicate the treatment 
effects without including other explanatory variables using OLS and interval regression, 
respectively. Consistent with the non-parametric tests presented in Table 2.2, I find that omitting 
information on effort elsewhere does not affect outcomes (as the coefficient on human-caused 
only is not significantly different from zero), but that the responsibility effect is substantial (as 
the coefficient on the effort elsewhere only treatment dummy is negative and significantly 
different from zero).  
 Controlling for participants‘ characteristics (columns 3 and 4), under both interval and 
ordered probit regressions, does not really affect the above estimated coefficients. However, the 
explanatory variables can be utilized as a test of construct validity. Construct validity is typically 
tested to examine whether or not the CVM captures preferences of people in the valuation (by 
looking at whether the correlation of economic variables such as cost and income with WTP 
value is as expected in standard economic principles). In Table 2.3, the economic variable, 
income of participants, seems to predict WTP values consistent with the standard expectation – 
that is, the higher the income, the higher the WTP values, and this relationship is significantly 
different from zero. 
 The regressions also indicate other participant-specific predictors of the WTP values. 
For instance, the older participants are more likely to have lower WTP values compared to the 
younger ones (less than 25 years of age), and the same holds for below-average educated 
participants (although not significantly so). 
 Another interesting point is that being engaged in local collaborative forest conservation 
shows a positive correlation with WTP. In the study area, it is possible to engage in forest 
conservation with a group called a collaborative forest management group (CFM). This is a local 
conservation group that looks after the surrounding forest.  
 Hence, the positive correlation sign of CFM membership and WTP in the regression is 
expected since the members are contributors to the public good. I also ran regressions testing 
whether the treatment effects differ between CFM members and non-CFM members. None of 







Table 2.3: Factors affecting contributions to the reforestation project. 






























Gender   -0.886 -0.355 
   (2.260) (0.348) 




Age (>25 yrs)   -10.92*** -2.374*** 
   (3.067) (0.713) 
Income   0.000847** 0.000114** 
   (0.000373) (0.0000509) 
Land Size   -0.495 -0.0793 
   (0.904) (0.123) 
CFM member   4.418** 0.591** 
   (2.081) (0.287) 
Village FE YES YES YES YES 
Constant 9.921*** 4.315** 10.75**  
 (1.599) (1.677) (4.331)  
Lnsigma  2.166*** 2.090***  





Observations 96 96 96 96 
Adjusted/Pseudo R2 
/Log pseudolikelihood  
0.379 -120.523 -114.417 0.3090 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Note: Column 1 presents OLS with the dependent variable WTP. Columns 2 and column 3present the 
interval regressions. The additional variables were included in column 4, which presents ordered probit 
regression of WTP on treatments with the additional explanatory variables.  
 
2.6. Aggregate WTPs and Robustness Checks 
 Reforestation provides a public good, and hence total willingness to pay is the sum of 
individual willingness to pays. I estimate the implications of the treatments for total willingness 
to pay using survival functions. Setting WTP responses as a survival function means that, instead 
of the original notion of ―time,‖ survival is defined by all the possible amounts (payments) that 
the respondents can contribute to the project. A respondent with positive willingness to pay 
―survives‖ that amount and a respondent with no willingness to pay ―fails‖ that amount. Here, 
the log likelihood function is calculated by the difference in WTP densities evaluated at 
contributions of 0, 10, 20, 30, 40 and 50 ETB. The likelihood function can then be maximized 
based on the selected parametric distribution (shape) such as in a standard Kaplan-Meier and 
Weibull estimator. Setting data into a survival function format mitigate the discrete nature of the 
WTP values (predicts the probability that true values are within the discrete values). A further 
advantage of utilizing this function is that the survival analysis is in line with the assumption of 
the key economic theory that the cost for the fraction of participants with positive WTP 
decreases monotonically (2003).  
 Hence, in this study, the Kaplan-Meier survival curve is used to present the summary 
measure of people‘s WTP under the three treatments (Figure 2.3). Given the right-skewed nature 
of WTP – that is, there seem to be individuals who are not willing to contribute – mean summary 
for welfare analysis might not be the correct representation. Hence, the demand for the 
environmental good under the three treatments is compared with the 50
th
 quintile of the graph. 
As can be seen from Figure 2.3, the human-caused only treatment appears to have a higher 





probability of survival at 0.5, the effort elsewhere only treatment appears to give 10 ETB versus 
about 20 ETB in the other two treatments. 
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2.6.1. Robustness Check: Estimators of WTP 
 I assess the role of covariates in the survival analysis using Weibull regression. In this 
model, the hazard measures risks faced by respondents in terms of failure (not paying). 
Accordingly, a higher hazard rate was associated with lower WTP values. In Weibull regression, 
since the reported coefficients of covariates are in the form of exp (βi), interpretation of the 
hazard rate requires transforming the coefficient to exp (βi) -1. Weibull regression results are 
reported in Table 2.4, which shows hazard increasing over the cost values (a positive sign of 
Weibull parameter ρ=2.90). That is, an increase in value by 10 ETB increases the likelihood of 
not leaving the lower WTP interval. As the values of WTP increase, the participants are less 
likely to pay more.  
 
Table 2.4. Weibull regression 
 WTP 
(Hazard ratio reported) 
  
Education (1-5yrs) 0.790 
(0.194) 










CFM member 0.639* 
 (0.169) 






Weibull parameter (ρ) 2.90 
(0.235) 
    Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 Table 2.4 shows and confirms that several explanatory variables are significant 
predictors of WTP decisions. For instance, being an older participant increases the hazard rate by 
more than 4 times over being a younger participant. That is, older participants are 4 times more 
likely not to leave the lower interval of WTP values. Being a CFM member decreases hazard by 
36% (0.627-1). Thus, a member is 36% less likely to stay in the lower interval, which indicates 
that CFM members have higher WTP than non-CFM members. Table 2.4 also shows that one 
ETB increase in income results in a zero hazard rate (1-1). This is to say, for one ETB increase, 
the hazard rate will stay constant. Hence, the economic variable seems to predict the WTP 
decision.  
 Furthermore, the role of treatments as shown by the Weibull regression similar to the 
results in the main finding mentioned before. In Table 2.4, the treatment coefficients show that 
being in the treatment group of effort-elsewhere only increases the hazard rate by more than 3 
times compared to the baseline treatment (i.e., combination). That is, being offered the effort-
elsewhere only scenario decreases WTP. In general, despite the assumption of a specific shape 
parameter in the Weibull regression, the results in this regression are consistent with the main 
findings (Table 2.3).  
2.7. Conclusions 
 The contingent valuation method was designed to elicit preferences for environmental 
goods for which conventional markets are unavailable (Carson et al., 2003; Hanemann, 1994). 
By allowing the attachment of monetary values to environmental goods, CV creates conventional 
market-like decision-making. In this study, we see evidence for this claim – that is, the creation 
of market-like behavior by CV – from the preferences of the subjects. Specifically, the 
relationship between the predictors and WTP values shows evidence of the subjects‘ preference 
for environmental goods. First, the economic variables seem to be in line with the standard 





predictors such as being a cooperative member of a local forest conservation seem to be 
correlated with higher WTP values.  
 This study tests the hypothesis of whether drawing attention to owns involvement of 
human-caused environmental damages increase the WTP estimates. I do so by offering 
respondents in Ethiopia‘s Bale Eco-region the opportunity to contribute to a reforestation project, 
using three different scenarios. All scenarios describe the issue of deforestation and 
desertification that is affecting the region. In one scenario additional information is provided that 
illegal logging plays a major role in this process, in another additional information is provided 
about the efforts other countries are undertaking to mitigate this problem of illegal logging; the 
third scenario offers both these types of information. Next I analyze how the contributions to the 
reforestation projects differ between the three different scenarios. This approach is akin to the 
contingent valuation method, which was designed to elicit preferences for environmental goods 
(Carson et al., 2003; Hanemann, 1994). My approach differs from this method by asking 
respondents to make real financial contributions. Asking for real contributions makes decisions 
consequential and makes sure that respondents will think hard about how much they are willing 
to provide, and hence mitigates the  effect of providing socially desired answers. Indeed, 
economic variables seem to predict contributions in a way that is in line with the standard 
economic theory; the higher the income the higher contributions made by the participants. Also, 
other predictors such as being a cooperative member of a local forest conservation seem to be 
correlated with higher contributions. 
 
 Extant literature notes that including information on human-caused environmental 
damage in contingent valuation surveys increases the WTP values. This was, however, attributed 
to outrage effect – that is, because respondents are upset, they contribute more to environmental 
goods. In a somewhat different setting this study finds evidence that contributions to a 
reforestation project by respondents who are implicated in the process of environmental 
degradation are not affected by information on efforts of others to mitigate the problem, but also 
that their contributions increase significantly and substantially if attention is drawn to their own 
responsibility in the deforestation and desertification process. 





of this study consists of participants who potentially engage in human-caused damage. In this 
case, the responsibility effect can be reinforced by including information on human-caused 
damage. Second, the majority of participants have a strong belief that the current environmental 






Can Uniform Price Auctions inform the design of 
Payments for Ecosystem Services schemes? 




Conservation payments have been advocated as both an effective and efficient means of 
protecting the planet‘s most valuable natural resources – especially if the payments are made 
conditional on the actual delivery of environmental outcomes above and beyond what would 
otherwise have materialized (Wunder, 2007; Wunder, Engel, & Pagiola, 2008). These 
conditional payments, typically referred to as Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES), have 
been implemented in developed and developing countries alike; prominent examples include the 
Conservation Reserve Program in the United States (Wu & Babcock, 1995) and the Pago por 
Servicios Ambientales Program in Costa Rica (Pattanayak, Wunder, & Ferraro, 2010b). The 
rationale behind PES is that without compensation, the resource owners incur the costs of 
conserving natural resources while they typically reap only a small share of the conservation 
                                                            
2 This chapter is based on joint work with Daan van Soest, Ty Turley, Paul Christian, 





benefits. That means that while the societal benefits of conservation typically exceed the costs, 
economic decision making is biased against conservation and towards resource degradation. 
Offering financial compensation, conditional on environmental service delivery, is thus a means 
of changing the resource owner‘s cost-benefit evaluation outcome in favor of conservation 
(Pattanayak, Wunder, & Ferraro, 2010a).  
Typically, conservation contracts are offered take-it-or-leave-it style, with the contracts 
specifying what services the resource owner needs to deliver as well as the amount of money she 
will receive in compensation if the contractual requirements are met. One of the key challenges 
in the design of Payments for Ecosystem Services schemes is to find the optimal compensation 
price. Offering a higher price results in a larger share of the resource owners agreeing to 
participate in the PES scheme, but at the expense of the amount of rents earned by the 
inframarginal resource owners (Engel, Pagiola, & Wunder, 2008). That means that the amount of 
environmental services obtained with a fixed budget are a hump-shaped function of the price 
offered, and hence finding the optimal price is a key challenge for any PES scheme.  
If the slope and location of the aggregate conservation cost schedule are known, the 
conservation agency (the government, or an NGO) can determine the optimal price to be offered. 
For example, if a large share of the resource owners can provide the conservation services at 
quite low cost while conservation is very expensive for the remaining ones, setting the price 
equal to the cost level of the most expensive among the low-cost farmers can result in high take-
up rates while limiting the excess compensation received by the infra-marginal resource owners. 
To implement this, three steps need to be taken: information should be collected on the location 
and slope of the aggregate conservation cost schedule, the optimal price should be determined 
given the available budget, and then conservation contracts can then be offered, take-it-or-leave-
it style, to the resource owners. 
This chapter focuses only on the first step of the process – identification of the location and 
slope of the conservation cost schedule. Resource owners differ in the (opportunity) costs they 
incur when supplying environmental protection, and typically these owners have better 
information about their private conservation costs than the potential buyer. Two potential 
solutions have been proposed to overcome this information asymmetry problem in the literature. 
The first is to offer different take-it-or-leave-it compensation prices to different groups of 





2009)). Different price levels result in different sign-up rates, and hence this approach allows the 
conservation buyer to trace the conservation supply schedule so that she can identify the price 
that minimizes average conservation costs. This approach is incentive compatible, but it is both 
expensive and cumbersome because the sample size needs to be fairly large for each price 
offered to have a sufficiently precise estimate of the take-up rates associated with that price, and 
possibly quite many prices need to be tested to approximate the aggregate conservation supply 
schedule. 
A second approach has been suggested by Jack, Leimona, and Ferraro (2009) and (Ajayi, 
Jack, & Leimona, 2012), and that is to use incentive-compatible valuation elicitation methods to 
uncover the levels and distribution of the conservation costs of a group of randomly selected 
resource owners. One candidate incentive-compatible valuation elicitation method is the 
(reverse) sealed-bid Uniform Price Auction (UPA), where potential service sellers are asked to 
indicate the minimum amount of money they need to receive to be willing to participate in the 
PES scheme. The potential sellers are informed that if their ―ask‖ turns out to be below a 
predetermined (but undisclosed) ―strike price‖ they are accepted into the program and will 
subsequently be paid the predetermined strike price if they meet the environmental requirements. 
If the amount they ask is above the predetermined price, they will not be offered the contract.  
Submitting one‘s true opportunity costs is a dominant strategy in this set up (Krishna, 
2009; Vickrey, 1961). Overasking does not yield any benefits if asking more than one‘s true 
opportunity costs still results in one being admitted to the program. The bidder is paid the 
predetermined price for her efforts – but this would also have been the case if she would have 
submitted an ask equal to her true opportunity costs. The bidder will regret having overasked if 
(i) participating in the program is profitable for her at the predetermined price and (ii) her ask 
turns out to be so high that she is not admitted to the program. So by overasking the bidder 
cannot win but may actually jeopardize the chance to earn money. And a similar reasoning 
implies that submitting an ask below one‘s true opportunity costs is never a profitable strategy 
either, because doing so may result in the agent being signed into the program at too low a price 
for the program to be profitable for her.
3
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 The Uniform Price Auction is thus very similar to the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) 





Submitting an ask equal to one‘s true opportunity costs is thus a dominant strategy in 
Uniform Price Auctions, and hence, in theory, the UPA approach allows the researcher to obtain 
precise values of the opportunity costs of resource owners. If resource owners know their 
conservation costs, the share of resource owners accepting a specific take-it-or-leave-it (TILI) 
price should be the same as the share of resource owners with asks equal to or below that price 
level in the UPA. After all, accepting a price offer that is higher than one‘s opportunity costs is a 
dominant strategy in take-it-or-leave-it contracts too, and hence this suggests that the UPA 
approach would be both a more precise and a more efficient way of uncovering the location and 
slope of the conservation costs schedule than the first approach in which the opportunity cost 




Despite the fact that theoretically TILI and UPA should result in the same take-up rate if 
the same strike price is use, there is some evidence that outcomes can be substantially different. 
Jack (2013) invited landowners in Malawi to participate in a tree planting project and finds that 
for a specific take-it-or-leave-it price offer take-up rates are more than twice as high than 
predicted by the UPA (99% actual uptake versus a predicated uptake of 37.5%). This suggests 
that UPA outcomes are a poor predictor of actual uptake when the contracts are offered take-it-
or-leave-it style. But interestingly she also finds that the actual survival rate is 15% higher 
among the PES participants who had been randomized into the UPA treatment. The fact that 
UPA underestimates take-up under TILI sheds doubt on the usefulness of UPA in motivating 
PES design. But the fact that survival rates are higher in UPA than in TILI suggests that 
suboptimally many resource owners decide to participate – not just the ones who have a good 
chance of meeting the contract specifications to receive payments. This may be wasteful because 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
(Becker, DeGroot, & Marschak, 1964). With BDM subjects are thus paid different prices for the 
same service, which was deemed problematic.  
4
 A third approach to overcome the asymmetric information problem is to induce competition 
between potential conservation service providers via selling contracts using get-paid-what-you-
ask auctions (Latacz‐Lohmann & van der Hamsvoort, 1998). These so-called discriminatory 
price procurement auctions result in resource owners receiving different amounts of 
compensation for the same type of conservation services supplied. This ex-post inequality 
reduces the mechanism‘s practical acceptability, and indeed discriminatory price procurement 





the financial payment is just part of the costs of a PES project – providing the seedlings and the 
materials for tree maintenance are costly too.  
In this paper, we replicate Jack (2013) result that with TILI price offers the take-up rates 
are significantly higher than when using UPA. We do so in a field-experimental setting very 
similar to that of her study, as we test for the difference in sign-up rates between TILI and UPA 
for a tree planting program in Northern Ghana. Above and beyond replicating her result, we also 
try to identify the mechanism causing this difference. 
 Perhaps surprisingly, the poor predictive power of UPA has not received much attention. 
Jack (2013) documents the lack of predictive power but was not able to identify the cause. To the 
best of our knowledge there is only one other paper that tests the predictive power of incentive-
compatible valuation techniques. Berry et al. (2015) explicitly aimed to test whether incentive-
compatible valuation mechanisms can indeed predict outcomes of TILI price offers, and 
constructed a series of experiments to identify the potential cause of any observed difference. 
Using the standard Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (1964) mechanism they find that households in 
Northern Ghana are, on average, about 15% more likely to purchase a water filter via TILI prices 
than via the BDM mechanism. They rule out that the difference in take-up rates is due to either 
anchoring or strategic considerations.
5
  
We complement the work by Berry et al. (2015) in that we try to uncover the mechanism 
causing the difference in take-up rates. We take a more cognitive (and behaviorally motivated) 
approach and argue that even if participants in TILI are instructed to carefully think through the 
consequences of saying yes or no to the price that will be offered to them in a moment – 
explicitly telling them to carefully think about the minimum amount of money they would need 
to receive to be willing to participate in the tree planting program – decision making is more 
careful and deliberate in UPA than in TILI. This mechanism would explain both the higher take-
up as well as the lower survival rates in TILI, as documented by Jack (2013). We hypothesize 
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 Both Jack (2013) and Berry et al. (2015) not only tested whether UPA results in different take-
up rates than TILI, but they also tested whether there are any consequences for behavior too. 
Jack (2013) finds that landowners who selected themselves into the tree planting program by 
means of UPA keep significantly more planted trees alive than those who signed up via TILI, 
and Berry et al. (2015) find that those households who bought the water filter via UPA use the 
water filter slightly more intensively than those who bought it via TILI (with the difference being 
significant at the 10% level only; they fail to detect any significant differences at 10% or better 





that if decision-making is more deliberate, the explanatory power of economic variables (like 
land area and ease of access to water needed to water the tree saplings) and preferences (like risk 
attitudes and time preferences) is higher under UPA than under TILI. Our results provide 
suggestive evidence that indeed decision making is more careful and deliberate under UPA than 
under TILI. Key variables that should increase a farmer‘s propensity to participate in the 
program (such as sizeable land area, easy access to water, and, albeit to a lesser extent, farmer 
characteristics like risk preferences) are predictive of uptake in the UPA treatment, but not in 
TILI.   
With these field-experimental results in hand, we turn to further test the hypothesis by 
implementing similar tests in a laboratory experiment. Laboratory experiments have the 
advantage over field experiments that they allow for less noisy hypothesis testing as the 
decisions to be made are less complex and because preferences can be elicited with more 
precision. We endow student subjects with a chocolate bar and subsequently offer them the 
possibility to sell back their bar using either the TILI or the UPA approach. We not only 
document that the sell-back rates are not invariant to the approach taken, but also that 
characteristics that are expected to affect the decision to keep the bar have predictive power in 
the UPA decisions but not in the TILI outcomes – as was the case in the field experiment. 
The set-up of this paper is straightforward. Section 2 presents the design and outcomes of 
the field experiment offering farmers in the arid Northern part of Ghana the opportunity to 
participate in a tree planting project, and section 3 does the same for the laboratory experiment 
implemented using student subjects from Tilburg University, the Netherlands. Section 4 
concludes. 
 
3.2. Field experiment 
Our field experiment is implemented as a subproject of Ghana‘s Sustainable Land and 
Water Management Project (SLWMP). This project aims to improve soil and water conservation 
in Ghana‘s arid North. This four-year project, co-financed by the World Bank, is implemented 
by the Government of Ghana, and consists of different types of interventions including 
agricultural soil erosion prevention methods such as intercropping of cash crops and leguminous 
food crops and the construction of bunds on field perimeters. It also includes a tree planting 





biological diversity (especially by providing habitat) and carbon sequestration. Trees thus 
provide global as well as local benefits, but in our case, they also provide private benefits – the 
species available for plantation in this project include mango, cashew, and mohagony. Despite 
the presence of private benefits, voluntary uptake is quite limited – because there are opportunity 
costs associated with having trees. Saplings need to be planted, but more importantly, to keep 
them alive they need to be watered in the first two years during the dry season, and from the third 
year onward the yields of other crops start to decline as the trees start to block sunlight (by 
providing shade).  
Because the number of farmers willing to engage in the SLWMP‘s voluntary tree planting 
was too low, the Government of Ghana agreed to experiment with a Payments for Ecosystem 
Services (PES) scheme where farmers receive financial compensation conditional on the number 
of trees surviving. The program is scheduled to run for four years (2016-2020), and the payments 
participants will receive are a declining function of the share of trees surviving. More 
specifically, farmers would be paid the full price if 75% or more of their trees are still alive at the 
end of the first year, half of the full price if at least 50% of them survive, and a quarter of the full 
price if 25% or more are still alive. If less than 25% of the trees are still alive, the farmers are 
paid nothing.  
 
3.2.1 Design of the field experiment 
In our randomized controlled trial (RCT), we implemented the two preference elicitation 
methods for PES programs, take-it-or-leave-it price offers (TILI) and Uniform Price Auctions 
(UPA), in six communities. These communities were randomly selected from a set of 80 eligible 
communities in the country‘s Northern, Upper East and Upper West regions. The RCT took 
place in May 2016.
6
 The RCT was implemented as follows.  
 Two days before visiting a community the local extension worker announced our visit to 
the local chief, and requested that all households having the right to plant trees on their land 
would be invited to send one household representative above the age of 18 – preferably the 
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 In addition, pilots were run in four communities, which resulted in a substantial shortening of 






household head – to the scheduled meeting.
7
 Upon arrival at the session, only those household 
representatives were admitted to the session who were at least 18 years old, and whose 
households had the power to plant trees on their land. Because of time constraints, the maximum 
number of participants in each community was set at 48; if more than 48 representatives of 
individual households were present, a lottery determined who would be admitted to the session. 
To control for any (observable and non-observable) community characteristics, we randomly 
assigned half of the community‘s household representatives to the TILI treatment, and the other 
half to the UPA treatment, i.e. we use a between-subjects design where treatments were 
randomized within communities. 
After having sent away all non-participant community members, we started by registering 
the names of all participants. We also implemented a short survey to elicit information on the 
respondent‘s personal characteristics (including gender and age), on his or her household‘s land 
size and tree ownership, on their perceived benefits of having trees on one‘s land, on some of 
their key preferences (including time preferences and risk preferences, elicited using non-
financially incentivized multiple price lists), and on a series of possible decision biases 
(including self-determination, (lack of) self-control, and optimism). Interviews were conducted 
by extension workers (sometimes with the help of translators) who had received a full day‘s 
instruction on the do‘s and do nots of survey implementation as well as on the TILI and UPA 
procedure. 
After all participants had been interviewed, the actual PES session started. Participants 
were informed that they would be given the opportunity to participate in a tree planting project. 
They were informed that if they participated in the project, they would be given 40 saplings of a 
(mixture of) tree species they preferred: mango, cashew, teak, acacia, etc. They were also 
informed that they would be provided with materials to protect the saplings from being eaten by 
livestock or wild grazers (especially chicken wire) and that their community would be provided 
with a donkey and cart to collect the water needed to keep the saplings alive. They were 
stimulated to think hard about the (public and private) benefits of having trees on their land (e.g., 
mango is expected to start bearing fruit after two years), but also about the (private) costs of 
doing so – the time and effort required to water the saplings and to protect the saplings from 
grazing, the fact that trees take up land that can otherwise be used for agriculture, etc. We 
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explained that in the first two years the main costs would be their time and effort to water the 
saplings (which needs to be done every two or three days in the dry season) and to protect them 
from being damaged by animals. After two years watering is no longer necessary because the 
trees‘ root system would by then have developed sufficiently to be able to extract water from the 
soils. We also stated that the most important costs from year 3 onwards would be reduced crop 
productivity because the trees would by then be sufficiently large to compete for both sunlight 
and water resources. If there were any questions on this, the farmers could ask their questions 
privately, upon which the session leader would repeat the question in neutral terms for the group 
to hear before answering it aloud.
8
 
Next, the participants were separated into two groups; the ones who would receive the TILI 
treatment, and the ones who would be offered to participate in the tree planting project via UPA. 
The groups convened in different locations in the community (usually in two areas close to the 
community‘s central area, at least 50 meters away from each other), and they were informed of 
the mechanism via which it would be decided whether they would participate in the tree planting 
program (and for what price), or not. Whereas the TILI procedure is quite straightforward, that of 
UPA is more difficult to understand. Therefore we also announced that each of the two groups 
would be carefully informed of the mechanism via which participation would be determined and 
that, as an illustration, we would do a practice round so that every participant would perfectly 
understand the procedures we would follow. Rather than risking anchoring participants on 
specific prices by doing a hypothetical example of the tree planting project, we chose to offer 
them the opportunity to sell us one of their shirts using the relevant procedure (TILI, or UPA). 
To ensure that the farmers would be paying close attention, the practice round was financially 
incentivized – if their decisions indicated that they would be willing to sell their shirt for the 
predetermined price that we were willing to pay, they would have to hand in their shirt, and they 
would be paid that predetermined price. We also told them that they were not allowed to 
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 This is to control the exchange of information among participants. A farmer‘s question would 
be rephrased for the rest of the group in neutral terms, and the answer given would also be 
factual – explaining parts of the procedure that were unclear or explaining why asking one‘s 
minimum price is in their best interest, but never any statements about, for example, what 






communicate during the session (neither verbally nor non-verbally), and that they would be 
excluded if they violated this rule. 
For both TILI and UPA it is essential that the prices the farmers in a community would be 
offered are (i) predetermined, (ii) the same for all participants in a community (to avoid conflict), 
and (iii) unknown not just to them but also to the experimenters and their translators. We 
implemented this as follows. For every community, we chose four different prices from the range 
of prices that we were willing to pay to buy their shirts (between 2 and 5 Ghana Cedis, that is 
between $0.50-$1.25), and we did the same for the range of prices the government of Ghana was 
willing to pay to each participant keeping 40 trees alive during the year (between 180 and 420 
Cedis – or between $45 and $100).
9
 Each price was written on two cards, each card was put in a 
small envelope, and the two small envelopes with the same price card were placed in a large 
envelope.  
At the session, we thus had two piles of four large envelopes (one pile of envelopes 
containing shirt prices, and the other one containing prices for the tree planting project), and a 
trusted member of the community was invited to come forward and choose one envelope from 
each of the two piles. The two selected large envelopes were opened, and each of the teams of 
extension workers implementing the TILI and UPA treatments received one small envelope 
containing the price we were going to pay for the shirts, and also another small envelope 
containing the tree planting compensation price. The small envelopes were not opened (and 
hence the price was kept secret) until either all participants had made their bid (in UPA) or until 
the moment just before subjects were asked to make their yes/no decision (in TILI). 
The mechanism used in the UPA treatment was explained as follows. Participants were 
reminded that the price at which we were going to buy their shirts is predetermined and hidden in 
the small envelope. They were asked to think hard about how much the shirt is worth to them – 
do they like their shirt, is it old or new, how costly would it be to go to the market to replace it? 
We told them that they would be asked to submit a bid for which they are willing to sell their 
shirt. If the price they asked for was smaller than or equal to the predetermined price in the 
envelope, they would receive the predetermined price and we would take home their shirt. If the 
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 Half of the communities are in Ghana‘s Sahel savanna (in the North-Eastern part of the 
country), and the half are in the Guinea savanna (in the North-West). Because the former is much 
drier than the latter, prices from the upper end of the range were offered to the communities in 





price they asked for turned out to be higher than the predetermined price, their shirt would be too 
expensive for us, and hence we would not buy it. They would keep their shirt, and they would 
not be paid the predetermined price. We then also told them explicitly what price they should ask 
for: the minimum amount of money that they would need to receive to be willing to sell their 
shirt to us. Asking a higher price than their minimum does not yield any benefits (if the price 
they ask is still lower than the predetermined price, they sell their shirt at the predetermined 
price, but this would also have been the outcome if they had asked their true minimum price), 
while it may turn out to be disadvantageous (if the predetermined price is in between the price 
they ask and the minimum price they need to receive, they would not sell their shirt, and hence 
they would fail to make a profitable trade). And similarly, we explained that asking for a price 
lower than their minimum price would never be advantageous either, but that it could be 
disadvantageous too. Participants were then given the opportunity to ask questions in private, 
which would then be answered in public.  
Next, the participants in the UPA treatment were called forward one by one. They were 
asked in private what minimum price they needed to receive to be willing to sell their shirt. After 
they stated their amount, the consequences of their asking price were explained once more
10
, and 
they were also asked whether they would want to revise the price they asked.
11
 After all 
participants in the UPA treatment submitted their asking price, the small envelope was opened 
and the price we were willing to pay for their shirt was revealed. Again, all UPA participants 
were called forward one by one to implement (or not implement) the trade. After this was 
completed we checked whether everyone understood the mechanism, whether (now that they 
learned the price) anybody regretted having asked the price they had asked and why, and whether 
everyone understood that it was in their best interest to ask the minimum price they needed to 
receive – not more, and not less. Again, all participants were allowed to ask their questions in 
private, which would subsequently be answered in public. We then continued with the tree 
planting bids, again explaining the benefits and costs, and emphasizing that they should think 
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  Defining Y as the price a participant had submitted, the relevant script was as follows. ―The 
amount you ask is Y Cedis. So if the price in the envelope is Y Cedis or higher, you would sell 
your shirt and be paid the higher, predetermined price. If the price in the envelope is lower than 
Y Cedis, you would not sell your shirt at the predetermined price. Do you understand?‖ 
11
 The script read as follows. ―Would you regret having asked Y Cedis if the price in the 





hard about the minimum amount of money they would need to receive to be willing to provide 
the service of keeping saplings alive for the 2016-2017 agricultural season.
12
 
The procedures and script used in TILI only differed from that of UPA in the description of 
the mechanism. Participants were encouraged to think hard about the benefits and costs of selling 
their shirts, and they were also encouraged to determine the minimum amount of money they 
needed to receive to sell their shirt or participate in the program. After all, having considered 
what the minimum is they need to receive, they should be happy to accept if the predetermined 
price is higher; if the predetermined price is lower, they should (be happy to) reject the price we 
offer. We re-emphasized that the prices for both the shirt and the tree planting project had been 
predetermined, and that they would be informed of the price in private, but that everyone 
ultimately is offered the same, still unknown, price. We checked whether everyone understood 
the procedure; any questions could be asked in private and were answered in public. Participants 
were then invited forward one by one. They were informed in private of the price in the envelope 
and were then asked whether they were willing to sell their shirt at that price, yes or no. Their 
answer was recorded, but trades were only implemented after all participants had made their 
decision.
13
 After completion of the trades we again checked their understanding, and if necessary 
participants could ask clarifications in private (with the answer being given in public). An 
analogous approach was implemented for the TILI tree planting project.  
Choosing what price to offer TILI (which is also to be used as strike price in UPA, to make 
sure that all participants in the program receive equal compensation) is complicated because the 
available information on opportunity costs was scarce and very imprecise. We proceeded as 
follows. First, in May 2016 we consulted close to 50 extension workers for their best guess of an 
―appropriate price‖. Based on these consultations, we set the price between 180 and 290 Cedis 
for the communities in the Guinea savanna regions in the North and North-West of Ghana, and 
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 The program is renewed every year, with the compensation level remaining the same in at 
least the first two years; the price may change after the third year because the nature of the net 
opportunity costs would change (from time and effort in the first two years to foregone crop 
revenues from year three onward, with the trees being expected to start producing fruits and nuts 
from the fourth year onward). We were careful in emphasizing the long-run nature of the tree 
planting program, but also stressed that the decision they needed to make was how much money 
they needed to receive for the program‘s initial period. 
13
 Because the trade does not take place at the same time as the decision is made, participants 
cannot observe what decisions their fellow participants made, and hence they can also not be 





between 380 and 480 Cedis for communities in the more arid Sahel savanna in the country‘s 
North-East. Second, we implemented these prices in four pilot communities in early May 2016. 
We noticed that signup rates were close to 100% in both TILI and UPA, and proposed to the 
government of Ghana‘s project team to reduce the actual payments to save budget. The 
government team decided, however, that lowering the prices offered to the remaining 
communities would be a potential source of unrest, and hence they decided that the prices 
offered should remain high. While good news for the farmers, such high prices potentially 
jeopardize the research because they would result in very limited variation in outcomes – nearly 
all farmers were expected be willing to participate in the program, independent of whether they 
had been randomized into the UPA or TILI treatments.  
As the government team was vehement that the prices should be kept very high, we 
decided to elicit take-up rates for much lower prices by asking TILI participants the following 
question: ―if the conditional compensation offered is X Ghana Cedis, would you be willing to 
participate in the tree planting project?‖, where X was either 10, 30, 60 or 100 Cedis. This 
question was asked before the actual predetermined price (which was 180 Cedis, or higher) was 
retrieved from the sealed envelope. The question was non-binding, but we are confident that the 
respondents perceived the question as a legitimate inquiry into their willingness to accept.
14
 Also 
note that the UPA protocol remained unchanged because by comparing the farmer‘s asking price 
to any of the prices we can determine whether the farmer would have been accepted into the 
program at that price, yes or no. 
The RCT was implemented in six communities, and in total 260 household representatives 
participated in this experiment. We decided to drop households from the analysis with 
unrealistically large reported land areas (more than 100 acres) and/or with unrealistically high 
reported tree densities (more than 75 trees per acre). Doing so resulted in a sample of in total 226 
households. Unfortunately, information on some key variables is missing for another 28, 
implying that our data set ultimately consists of 198 households, 97 of whom participated in the 
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 Participants were very much aware that their answers could not influence the price they would 
be offered – as the price was in the envelope. Hence, there is no reason for strategic 
misrepresentation. Also, comparing participation rates in the four pilot communities (without the 
extra question) to those in the last six communities (with the extra question), we do not find any 
evidence that this additional question affects the TILI participants‘ propensity to accept the 










Table 3.1: Balance test for the field experiment 
 TILI UPA Difference p-value 
Female 0.330 0.257 0.073  0.258 
  (0.048) (0.043) (0.064)  
     
Age 42.742 41.657 1.085  0.621 
  (1.621) (1.484) (2.193)  
     
Land area 14.624 11.619 3.005  0.123 
 (acres) (1.681) (1.032) (1.940)  
     
Access to water point 0.165 0.162 0.003  0.954 
 (dummy variable) (0.038) (0.036) (0.052)  
     
Owns trees 0.969 0.943 0.026  0.369 
  (0.018) (0.023) (0.029)  
     
Perceived benefits of  2.361 2.433 -0.072  0.578 
         trees (numbers) (0.092) (0.090) (0.129)  
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 Not dropping the 34 households with unrealistically large reported land areas and tree densities 
results in the two treatments failing to be balanced on these variables. Because households were 
randomized into TILI and UPA within each community, this imbalance suggests that the 
reported numbers are indeed unrealistically high. All results reported in the rest of the paper are, 





     
Volatile agricultural  3.567 3.538 0.029  0.712 
   revenues (perceived) (0.051) (0.058) (0.077)  
     
RiskAversion
a
 27.158 27.048 0.110  0.968 
  (2.034) (1.820) (2.721)  
     
Impatience
b
 90.372 82.000 8.372  0.576 
  (11.205) (9.985) (14.959)  
N 97 105 202  
a The survey question measures the minimum amount a subject needs (in Cedis) to receive with certainty to prefer 
that to participating in a lottery with a 50-50 chance of receiving 50 Cedis. A metric of risk aversion is obtained by 
subtracting the minimum amount to be received from the maximum payoff in the lottery (50 Cedis). The higher the 
number thus obtained, the more risk averse is the respondent. 
b Minimum amount needed (in Cedis) to receive in 31 days to prefer that to receiving 20 Cedis tomorrow. 
 
As shown in Table 3.1 the treatments are balanced on all variables. This is not very 
surprising because of our fairly large sample size, and also because of the fact that randomization 
occurred at the within-village level was instrumental in obtaining balance. We also have balance 
on key observable respondent characteristics like gender and age (the latter was verified using 
voting card IDs), and also on most of the variables measuring individual preference and attitudes.  
 
3.2.2  Results of the field experiment 
 We first present the results of participants‘ willingness to sell their shirt in the take-it-or-
leave-it (TILI) and the uniform price auction (UPA) approach. Table 3.2 shows the take up rates 
under the two approaches. We determine the willingness to sell of those participants participating 
in the UPA treatment by simply comparing the ask they submitted to the price we want to 
evaluate their decision at (2, 3, 4 or 5 Cedis). The procedure is somewhat more involved for the 
TILI participants. Participants were offered different prices for their shirts, and hence we observe 





observe that someone is willing to sell for 2 Cedis, we also know that she would have been 
willing to sell for 3, 4, or 5 Cedis, and hence we code her decision accordingly for these prices 
too. Similarly, if we observe that someone is not willing to sell for 5 Cedis, we also know that 
she would not have been willing to sell if the price offered had been 4, 3 or 2 Cedis. Using these 
coding procedures, Table 3.2 shows the shares of subjects willing to sell their shirt at the price 
levels offered. 
 
Table 3.2: Shares of subjects willing to sell their shirts in the TILI and UPA treatments, for 
different price levels 
Price (in Cedis) TILI Auction Difference p-value a 
2 0.204 0.209 -0.004 0.946 
3 0.645 0.283 0.362 0.000 
4 0.930 0.353 0.578 0.000 
5 0.968 0.458 0.510 0.000 
 
a p-values obtained using two-sided two-proportions tests. 
Table 3.2 shows that participants in the TILI treatment are more willing to sell their shirt for 3 
out of the 4 prices we offered; the difference in participants‘ propensity to sell between the two 
treatments only fails to be significantly different at the lowest price we offered.  
 Table 3.2 provides a glimpse that the two mechanisms may indeed turn out to be different 
in practice, and we now proceed testing whether this is indeed also true for our participants‘ 
decision to accept participating in the tree planting program. Participation rates under UPA and 
TILI for a selection of prices are presented in Table 3.3. For each respondent in the UPA 
treatment we looked up whether her ask was above or below each of the specific prices, and 
subsequently calculated, for each of these prices, the share of participants who had submitted an 
ask less than or equal to that specific price. As the mechanism is incentive compatible, this is our 
best predictor of take-up rate in the group of respondents who were offered the contract with a 
specific price, take-it-or-leave-it style. For example, we observe that 48% of the participants in 
the UPA treatment submitted an ask less than or equal to 10 Cedis, and hence we expect 48% of 
the participants in the TILI group to be willing to participate when offered the contract with 10 





among the group of respondents who were offered the opportunity to participate take-it-or-leave-
it style.  
 
Table 3.3: Shares of subjects accepting actual (180 and higher) and virtual price (100 and 
lower) offers in the TILI and UPA treatments. 
 Price offered Sh. Accepted UPA Sh. Accepted TILI p-value 
 
Hypothetical 10 0.476 0.655 0.0962 
prices 30 0.581 0.927 0.0000 
 60 0.742 0.975 0.0000 
 100 0.800 1.000 0.0036 
Actual prices 180 0.725 0.933 0.008 
 380 0.975 1.000 0.103 
 >380 0.971 1.000 0.081 
a p-values obtained using two-sided two-proportions tests.  
 
        Not surprisingly Table 3.3 shows that the share of respondents deciding to participate is a 
(weakly) increasing function of the conservation price offered, independently of whether the 
respondents participated in the UPA or TILI treatment. More importantly, we find that when 
offered a specific price take-it-or-leave-it style, respondents are (much) more likely to agree to 
participate in the PES program than those who are requested to submit their ask in the UPA 
treatment. We thus find that there is a systematic and significant difference between the farmers‘ 
propensity to participate in the PES program in the UPA treatment and in the TILI treatment. 
UPA systematically and significantly underestimates farmers‘ propensity to participate in the 
PES program when contracts are offered take-it-or-leave-it style. This difference is substantial, 
and even remains significantly different for the real prices offered (180 Cedis and higher). We 
thus replicate Jack (2013) result that the UPA mechanism results, and substantially so, in lower 





 So what causes this difference between predicted and actual uptake? Jack (2013) 
documented the difference too, but was unable to identify the mechanism. Berry et al. (2015) 
also test whether an incentive-compatible valuation mechanism – in their case Becker-de Groot-
Marshack (BDM) – is a good predictor of agents‘ behavior respondents‘ propensity to purchase. 
They offer participants, poor farmers in northern Ghana, the opportunity to buy a new water 
filter. They thus look at the buyer‘s side of the market (as opposed to our focus on the seller‘s 
side) and find that their incentive-compatible value elicitation mechanism underestimates their 
respondents‘ propensity to purchase the water filter.  
 Comparing the outcomes of Berry et al. (2015), Jack (2013) and ours, it is interesting to 
note that all three find that the incentive-compatible mechanisms underpredict market 
transactions that occur with take-it-or-leave-it offers, independent of whether the respondents are 
on the buyer‘s or the seller‘s side of the market. Berry et al. hypothesize that in their experiment 
the difference in take-up rates is due to strategic considerations playing (a more important) role 
in their BDM treatment than in the TILI treatment. They experimentally vary disclosure of the 
water filter‘s sales price at the markets in the regional capital (which may affect BDM bids via 
anchoring) and they also experimentally vary the provision of information that the study‘s 
outcomes will be used to determine the filter‘s future sales prices when their supply is scaled up 
in the villages. None of these manipulation significantly affects outcomes, suggesting the 
difference between predicted and observed purchase rates is due to neither strategic bidding nor 
to anchoring.  
 In this study we test the relevance of an alternative mechanism, based on the hypothesis 
that the UPA invites more deliberate and hence also more careful decision making than take-it-
or-leave-it price offers. Even though we explicitly instruct our TILI participants to carefully 
think through the consequences of saying yes or no to the price that will be offered to them in a 
moment – explicitly telling them to carefully think about the minimum amount of money they 
would need to receive to be willing to participate in the tree planting program – the actual 
incentive to think through the consequences of one‘s decisions is stronger if one is asked to 
submit than if one knows the contract price will be revealed before one has to make a decision 
oneself. We hypothesize that if decision-making is more deliberate, the explanatory power of 
economic variables (like available land area and prior experience with the benefits of having 





psychological characteristics like optimism and impulsiveness) is higher under UPA than under 
TILI.  
          To test this hypothesis, we focus our attention on analyzing differences in outcomes 
between TILI and UPA for the (Shanahan, 2012 100)1 price set (as we do not have any variation 
in the TILI decisions for the actual prices). In the case of TILI we simply regress the yes/no 
decision on the price offered on a series of economic variables influencing the costs and benefits 
of participating in the program (like land area, and whether one has experience with the benefits 
of having trees on one‘s land), and also on a series of personal characteristics like gender, age, 
and ―behavioral‖ parameters like risk aversion, impatience, optimism.  
 We implement the same analysis for UPA, but the procedure is slightly more complex 
because the outcomes of the analysis may be dependent on whether an individual‘s participation 
decision is determined using a strike price of 10 Cedis, or of 100 Cedis. For every participant in 
the UPA treatment in a community, we randomly select one of the prices (10, 30, 60, 100) that 
had been offered to the TILI participants in her community. We compare the participant‘s asking 
price in the UPA to the randomly selected price, and the participant is coded as accepting to 
participate in the tree planting project if the former is less than or equal to the latter. Outcomes 
may depend on the assignment of prices to the participants, and hence we implement a Monte 
Carlo approach using 1000 replications for each model specification we use.  
 Table 3.4 presents the probit regression results explaining the participants‘ decisions to be 
in the tree planting program for the UPA and TILI households using two different specifications. 
The price offered is included in specification (i), and so are key farm characteristics that are very 
likely to affect the farmer‘s propensity to participate in the tree planting program – land area, 
access to water, and the presence of trees. The propensity to participate is expected to be higher 
the higher is the price offered, the larger the farm‘s land area, and if there is easy access to water 
to be able to water the saplings in the dry season. The fourth variable included, the presence of 
trees on the farmer‘s land, is also likely to affect participation decisions, although the sign of the 
coefficient is ex-ante ambiguous. It may be positive if having trees on their land implies that 
farmers are more acutely aware of the (private) benefits of having them, but of course, it may 
also be negative if there are diminishing marginal returns to having trees on one‘s land. 
Specification (ii) includes, in addition to the ones included in (i), characteristics of the farmer 





volatile, (im)patience, impulsiveness, whether he/she is optimistic about his/ her future 
prospects, and also a set of interaction terms.
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 Focusing first on specification (i) in Table 3.4, the propensity of farmers to participate is 
increasing in the price offered in both the UPA and TILI treatments. However, while all three 
key farm characteristics are highly significant in the UPA treatment, only one of them – the 
presence of trees on one‘s land – shows up significantly in the TILI treatment, whereas both the 
available land area and easy access to water are not found to affect the farmer‘s participation 
decision. Adding additional controls (see specification (ii) for both UPA and TILI) does not 
affect these results, and while the farmers‘ personal characteristics do not seem to be very 
important drivers of decision making, there are still marked differences between UPA and TILI. 
First and foremost, optimism about the future is the only farmer characteristic that shows up 
significantly in the TILI regressions; all other variables are far from significant. In UPA there is 
also just one variable showing up significantly at the 10% level or better. By itself, farmers‘ 
perceiving their farm revenues as very volatile does not affect their decisions, and the same holds 
for their risk postures. However, the above-average risk averse farmers are more likely to sign up 
for the tree planting program if the farm revenues are more volatile (p = 0.093) – as the tree 
planting project can be seen as a means to diversify risk. This interaction term is the only 
significant variable in UPA, but it is interesting to see that there are three other ones that are 
close to being significant (with p-values below 0.15). Interacting time preferences and 
impulsiveness, we find that the p-value on patience is 0.13, which suggests that more patient 
farmers are more likely to sign up – unless they also tend to be more impulsive (p = 0.15). And 
also optimism only just fails to be significant in the UPA regressions (p = 0.11)  
 
Table 3.4: Probit regression results explaining participants’ decision to (not) accept to be in 
the tree planting program.  
 
    
 UPA TILI 











(0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) 
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 Risk attitude (being risk averse), patience, optimism, and impulsiveness are all dummy 










 -0.001 -0.011 
 
(0.010) (0.014) (0.006) (0.014) 
  
   




 -0.325 -0.540 
 
(0.393) (0.384) (0.511) (0.463) 
  











(0.285) (0.299) (0.506) (0.576) 
  
   
Female -0.296  -1.004 
 
 (0.336)  (0.622) 
  
   
Age 
 
0.550  0.071 
  
(0.353)  (0.442) 
  









(0.339)  (0.435) 





  -0.377 
 
 
(0.311)  (0.858) 
 
 
   
Impulsive 
 
0.155  -0.520 
  
(0.549)  (0.796) 
  
   




  0.153 
  
(0.714)  (1.345) 
  
   
Risk averse 
 
-0.036  0.385 
  
(0.312)  (0.785) 
  
   
Volatile revenues -0.597  0.822 
 
 (0.449)  (0.584) 
 
    
Risk averse x Volatile   0.866
*
  -0.854 
Revenues  (0.348)  (0.725) 
N 105 105 99 97 
Pseudo R2 0.17 0.30 0.19 0.36 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the community level. +  p < 0.15,  * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 Our findings thus suggest that key variables pertaining to the perceived costs and benefits 
of participating in the program (access to water and land area) have explanatory power in the 
UPA treatment but not in the TILI treatment, and there are also traces of evidence that also more 
behavioral parameters tend to affect decisions in the former whereas they are nowhere near 





more deliberate in UPA than in TILI.
17
 Deciding whether or not to participate in a program for a 
given price requires less mental effort than deciding what the minimum amount of money is that 
one needs to receive to be willing to participate in the program. If this is the case in the field, we 
should be able to find similar results in a laboratory environment, where the decision situation 





3.3. The laboratory experiment 
 To further test whether decision making is more deliberate in UPA than in TILI, we 
decided to implement a laboratory experiment in which we would endow our subjects with an 
item that we would subsequently buy back using either UPA or TILI. For this test, the choice of 
the item to be sold by the participants is crucial. For the laboratory experiment to be able to 
reflect the outcomes of the field, we should endow participants with an item where (i) observable 
personal characteristics are (expected to be) predictive of individual subject‘s valuation of the 
item under consideration (similar to the role of observables like land area and access to a water 
in the field experiment), and where (ii) behavioral parameters (like patience and risk preferences 
in the field experiment) are expected to be predictive too. Identifying such an item is not trivial. 
After all, subjects in the lab are predominantly WEIRD
19
, and hence it is not straightforward to 
find specific observables that are predictive of the decision to sell (or not to sell) a specific item.  
 Gender is an obvious individual characteristic of any randomly selected sample of WEIRD 
subjects, and hence we searched the literature to find an item that tends to be evaluated 
differently by different genders. Rozin, Levine, and Stoess (1991), analyzed gender differences 
in the appreciation of various food items and identified chocolate as one of the items where the 
gender difference in appreciation is largest – with female students appreciating chocolate better 
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 Of course, more considerate decisions are not necessarily better decisions if ―behavioral 
biases‖ are dominant. We will come back to this issue later on in this paper. 
18
 Of course, the true test of whether decision making is indeed more deliberate (and hence also 
better) is whether the survival rates are higher under UPA than under TILI. At the time of writing 
this chapter that information is not available yet. Also it is doubtful whether our experiment 
would be able to detect such an effect, as the payments offered by the government are so high 
that the incentives to keep the trees alive are very strong – even for those who accepted 
participating in the program without thinking through all the consequences. But this is left for 
future research, when the survival data become available. 
19





than male students. Knetsch (1989), documented that the propensity to sell chocolate bars in the 
laboratory is affected by the degree of loss aversion, and hence we decided to endow student 
subjects with chocolate bars, and buy them back using either UPA or TILI. 
 The stakes in and complexity of selling a chocolate bar in the laboratory are negligible 
compared to the considerations involved in the decision whether or not to participate in a multi-
year tree planting program in the field. This means that asking WEIRD subjects to sell their 
chocolate bars under either UPA or TILI in the laboratory is a strong test of the hypothesis that 
decision making is more considerate in the UPA treatment than in TILI. 
 
3.3.1 Design of the laboratory experiment 
 The chocolate bar we selected is of a brand that was introduced in the Netherlands just a 
few weeks before the implementation of the experiment. That means that our subjects did not 
have prior information on sales values they might anchor their bids on.
20
 Also, at the time of the 
experiment the taste was new for the Dutch market (salty fudge and brownie). Upon entering the 
lab the subjects received their chocolate bar (wrapped and sealed), and were offered the 
opportunity to sample the chocolate by taking a piece from a plate which was passed around. 
Unbeknown to the subjects we recorded whether a subject did or did not decide to taste the 
chocolate.  
 The actual implementation of the UPA and TILI treatments mimicked the field procedures 
as closely as possible. In the general introduction subjects were informed that the chocolate bar 
they received was theirs, but that they would be offered the possibility to sell it back during the 
session. We emphasized that they should carefully consider how they appreciated the bar; do 
they like the taste, etc. We also announced that the price at which we were willing to buy back, 
had already been determined. The price was set at market price estimate in the first session of the 
chocolate sell and we varied the prices for some of the sessions. We then proceeded with the 
treatment-specific instructions, informing the subjects of the way (UPA, or TILI) in which they 
would be offered the choice to sell back their bar to us. We implemented the same scripts of 
informing subjects (about the incentive-compatibility) of the two mechanisms as we used in the 
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field. We elicited risk and loss aversion preferences using a financially incentivized multiple-
price list approach (Holt & Laury, 2002). 
 In total, 132 subjects participated in 7 sessions; 73 in the UPA treatment and 59 in the TILI 
treatment. We recorded their gender, country of origin, what study program they were in, and 
whether they were willing to sample the chocolate. We hypothesize that decision making is more 
deliberate in UPA than in TILI, and this hypothesis can be tested in two ways. First, deliberate 
decision-making takes time, and hence we test whether the amount of time needed to take a 
decision differs between the two treatments. The second approach is via regressions similar to 
the ones presented in the field – if UPA induces more deliberate decision making than TILI we 
expect key explanatory variables like gender and loss aversion (measured using a financially 
incentivized multiple price list) to have more explanatory power in UPA than in TILI.  
 
3.3.2 Results of the laboratory experiment 
 We first test whether indeed subjects in TILI are more prone to selling their bar than those 
in UPA. Figure 3.1 presents the opportunity cost schedule of the asks in UPA (the 
upwardsloping, non-interrupted line), the predetermined strike price (the dashed, horizontal line), 
as well as the share of subjects willing to sell their bar at that predetermined price. As was the 
case in the field, the share of subjects willing to sell is higher in TILI than in UPA. The 
respective shares are 0.64 and 0.48, and this difference is significant at p = 0.059 according to a 
standard two-sided Chi-squared test. So, we find a difference in take-up rates of about 16 







Figure 3.1: The chocolate bar opportunity cost schedule, the predetermined strike price and the 
shares of subjects in UPA and TILI who are willing to sell their bar at the predetermined price in 





Having established a difference between selling rates in UPA and in TILI, we test 
whether decision making is indeed more deliberate in the former than in the latter. Figure 3.2 
shows the means of times taken to make the decisions (whether to accept selling one‘s bar for the 
predetermined price in TILI, and one‘s asking price to be willing to part with one‘s chocolate bar 
in the UPA treatment). The results found are in line with our expectations. The mean time taken 
in UPA is 40.52 seconds, as compared to 23.93 seconds in TILI. This difference is significant at 
























Figure 3.2: Box plots of decision times in UPA and TILI (in seconds). 
 
 
Note: The plots show the intervals containing the middle 50% (in the boxes) and 90% (the barred lines) of the 
observations, as well as the outliers in terms of time taken. The horizontal lines in the boxes give the median times. 
 
 Next, we test whether key characteristics like gender and loss aversion can explain at least 
some of the variation in sales outcomes in UPA, and not in TILI. To do this, we ran several 
specifications of a probit regression model (analogous to those presented in Table 3.4 for the 




Table 3.5: Probit regression results explaining student participants’ decision to (not) accept 
to sell their chocolate bar.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 UPA TILI UPA TILI 
     
Unwilling to  0.389 0.0554 0.379 0.0639 
Taste (0.722) (0.752) (0.750) (0.834) 
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 Two subjects switched columns more than once in their loss aversion multiple price list, and 
hence their choices are inconsistent. We excluded these two observations from the regression 
analysis. Also, we decided to not include risk aversion as a control variable in the regression 
analysis. No fewer than 107 of our 131 participants were found to be risk neutral, and hence the 




















     
Western  -0.192 0.294 -0.149 0.295 
European (0.326) (0.206) (0.293) (0.205) 






 (0.419) (0.399) (0.353) (0.582) 
     
Loss Averse -0.0111 0.0251 0.500 -0.0129 
 (0.369) (0.171) (0.378) (0.240) 
     
Loss Averse x    -1.082
***
 0.0843 
Male   (0.360) (0.910) 
     
Constant -0.0901 -0.125 -0.371
***
 -0.111 
 (0.182) (0.321) (0.135) (0.369) 
N 71 56 71 56 
adj. R
2
 0.015 0.069 0.045 0.069 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 3.5 present the results, for UPA and TILI respectively, when 
controlling for, among others, gender and loss aversion. Gender shows up significantly for TILI, 
at p = 0.071. Columns (3) and (4) show the results upon adding the interaction term between 
gender and loss aversion. The substantial increase in the adjusted R
2
 suggests that the results of 
column (3) are preferred to those of column (1). Comparing (3) and (4), the results are quite 
striking. None of the explanatory variables we collected has any predictive power in TILI, while 
we find both the observable variable (gender) as well as the behavioral parameter (loss aversion, 
for men) significantly affect a subject‘s propensity to sell in UPA. Consistent with Rozin et al. 
(1991) we find that male students have a lower appreciation of chocolate (and hence are more 
willing to sell) than female students. And we also find that male students with above-median 
levels of loss aversion are less likely to sell than below-median loss averse men. Female students 
and loss averse male students are thus less eager to sell their bars than ―loss neutral‖ male 
students. The fact that behavioral and observable (or economic) characteristics are predictive of 
decisions in UPA but not in TILI parallels the outcomes of the field experiment, and thus adds 







Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) schemes have rapidly gained importance as an 
instrument to stimulate environmental conservation on private land. Typically, the purchaser of 
nature conservation services (the government, or an NGO) offers landowners a contract, take-it-
or-leave-it (TILI) style, specifying the types of activities a landowner should undertake and the 
amount of compensation she will receive in return.  
One of the key challenges for PES design is to find the appropriate compensation level. 
Offering too low a price does not induce conservation, a price that is too high quickly exhausts 
the PES budget. Economic theory has developed several ―truth-telling mechanisms‖, so-called 
incentive compatible value elicitation methods, in which revealing one‘s actual (opportunity) 
costs of service provision is the optimal strategy. Theoretically, behavior under both mechanisms 
should be the same, and hence for a given price take-up rates should be the same.  In this paper, 
we replicate Jack‘s (2013) result that for a given compensation price, the share of landowners 
agreeing to participate in a PES program is substantially higher when offering them a contract 
take-it-or-leave-it style than predicted using another incentive-compatible elicitation method, the 
Uniform Price Auction.  
We hypothesize that the difference is caused by the fact that indicating one‘s true 
willingness to accept is much more cognitively demanding than making the decision whether one 
is willing to participate in the program for a specific price. We find some evidence for this claim 
in the field experiment on reforestation we implemented in Northern Ghana, as we find that 
variables that plausibly predict participation (like land area) show up significantly in the 
regressions explaining participation using the incentive-compatible elicitation method (the 
Uniform Price Auction), but that the coefficients on these variables are not significant in the 
regressions explaining participation in the take-it-or-leave-it treatment. We proceed by running a 
laboratory experiment with (i) a much easier decision problem (whether subjects are willing to 
sell back the bar of chocolate that they received before, (ii) where we have priors on observable 
characteristics (gender) and behavioral parameters (loss aversion) that plausibly affect outcome 
of the decision variable (sell, or not sell), and (iii) where we can easily observe how much time it 
takes to make the decision – which is arguably correlated with how difficult the decision task is 
considered to be. Consistent with our expectations, we find that both gender and attitudes to 





it treatment, and we also find that the time needed to make the decision in nearly twice as long in 
the former than in the latter treatment.  
We thus find that decision making is more deliberate in UPA than in TILI. Despite the 
fact that implementing UPA is more complex than implementing TILI, the government may 
prefer to op for the former – especially if the PES compensation price is a relatively small share 
of the total conservation costs involved (because of all the other costs, such as the costs of 


















Trust and Trustworthiness between cooperators and 
non-cooperators in Public Good Provision: 
Evidence from an Artefactual Field Experiment in 
Ethiopia 
 
4.1. Introduction  
Trust and trustworthiness are important elements in the dynamics of cooperation and 
development (Bouma et al., 2008; Fukuyama, 1995; Knack, 2001). Trust and other pro-social 
behaviors are also crucial factors in overcoming collective action problems (Ostrom, 1991; 
Ostrom, 2014). Standard economic theory predicts that collective action problems arise because 
selfish agents have no incentive to contribute to public goods (Olson, 2009). However, numerous 
empirical and experimental studies show that substantial shares of mankind contribute to public 
goods (Andreoni & Samuelson, 2006; Chaudhuri, 2011; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999), implying the 
existence of the conditional cooperators in addition to selfish agents. Furthermore, cooperators 
tend to initiate these contribution actions, trust more and are more trustworthy (Algan & Cahuc, 
2010; Bouma et al., 2008; Knack, 2001; Ostrom, 2000).   
However, whether the observed cooperation can be sustained, with multiple types of 
agents in the population, is an empirical question.  Insights can be derived from predictions of 
existing theories to understand trust and trustworthiness between cooperators and non-
cooperators. Social identity theory predicts that people have more affinity towards their fellow 
in-group member than non-group member (Tajfel, 1974). If conditional cooperators and selfish 
agents can engage in potentially mutually beneficial yet strategically risky exchange 
opportunities, the prediction of social identity theory could be the strategy taken by the agents. 
There are extensive experimental studies in discrimination literature which examine in-group and 
out-group biases (see meta analysis by Lane, 2016). Findings of these studies suggest that by and 





identity theory. However, most of these studies utilized what is called the minimal group 
paradigm, i.e., laboratory assigned identity which is distinct from real-world identity (Goette, 
Huffman, & Meier, 2012; Lane, 2016). Goette et al. (2012), examined to what extent the test of 
in group-out group biases observed in a minimal group setting yields different result if real 
identity is to be considered. Their findings pointed out that lab-induced identity and real-world 
social ties yield different results. And there is a need to conduct more field-based experiments to 
understand in-group and out-group biases and its role on the outcome such as cooperation. 
Another way to understand in-group-out-group biases, in the context of whether to trust 
or not, is to look at if these biases have also their beginning originated in indirect evolution 
theory. The indirect evolutionary theory states that biases might arise not only because of the 
player‘s identity or social ties but whether the player's given identity is also considered as 
reciprocal type. This is because the indirect evolutionary theory assumes that perhaps most of the 
cooperation observed is sustained with the desire of being reciprocated (Güth & Yaari, 1992). 
Accordingly, the less reciprocal types are selected against, which makes reciprocity an 
evolutionarily stable strategy (Güth, 1995). 
As an extension of this theory, Ostrom (2014) proposed a revised theory of collective 
action to explain how trust and other prosocial behavior evolve to enable cooperation. Ostrom‘s 
revised theory of collective action predicts that players receive an objective payoff but the 
decision is based on the transformation of the objective payoff into intrinsic value. For instance, 
conditional cooperative players value trust, fairness and other pro-social behaviors that in turn, 
adds a subjective change parameter to actions that are consistent with their norms. Hence, these 
conditional cooperators are modeled to be a trustworthy type, while selfish agents are forward-
looking and self-interested. When information about the types of players (conditional 
cooperators vs. selfish agents) is provided and if players can engage in potentially mutually 
beneficial yet strategically risky exchange opportunities, the conditional cooperators will 
consistently receive a higher payoff. Thus, using evolutionary reasoning only the conditional 
cooperators will survive if complete information is available (Ostrom, 2000).  
The similarity of the two theories is that both theories predict the decision of subjects 
correlates with the identity of whom they are matched with conditional on own identity. Since to 





own identity and ii) identity of another player. This can be demonstrated with a standard trust 
game (Berg et al., 1995), where full information of the group and non-group member type is 
known. The difference between the two theories is described in the following illustration. 
Suppose in the trust game, there are two types of players; group members and non-group 
members. Suppose that group members are considered more trustworthy, while non-members are 
considered to be more selfish. Also assume that there is full information on the types of the 
players. Then social identity theory predicts that group members trust other group members more 
than that they trust non-group members, and the reverse will hold for non-group members. Yet 
indirect evolutionary theory predicts that both group members and non-group members will put 
more trust in group members,  
To test the pertinence of these theories, I designed a setting in which participants who are 
members of Collaborative Forest Management group (CFM), along with some non-members 
(non-CFM), play a trust game. The trust game is a standard experimental procedure to measure 
the level of trust and trustworthiness (Berg et al., 1995). The game is played by two players, one 
of whom is the first mover and the other is the second mover. In the game, the first mover is 
endowed with a certain amount of money and has to decide if and how much money to send to 
the second mover. The amount sent by the first mover is usually tripled by the experimenter 
before it is sent to the second mover. The second mover has to decide how much of the money 
received to send back to the first mover. Standard economic theory predicts that (selfish) second 
movers will not return any money, and therefore (selfish) first movers will not send any money 
in the first place. However, a first mover may give money to the second mover in the hope that 
her trust will be reciprocated. Trust is then measured by the amount sent, and trustworthiness is 
measured by the amount returned. 
In the current setting, social identity theory predicts that members of a group send higher 
amounts to other group members than to non-group members whereas non-group members send 
higher amounts to fellow non-group members. Ostrom (2000) theory of collective action, on the 
other hand, assumes that there are (at least) two types of agents, selfish types, and conditional 
cooperators. And, even though conditional cooperators are more likely to display pro-social 





players), all types will favor the cooperator type. As both theories offer different alternative 
hypotheses we can use the experimental data to test which one is most appropriate.  
In this study, the group members are specifically the members of a Collaborative Forest 
Management (CFM) group. CFM was deployed initially as a rational response to a crisis in forest 
management in the 21st century that had clearly signaled sustainable forest management to be 
unfeasible (Lawlor, Madeira, Blockhus, & Ganz, 2013; Pinyopusarerk, Tran, & Tran, 2014). 
CFM is used as a conservation tool in developing countries, the Americas, Australia and also 
some parts of Europe (Dyke, Cash, Brody, & Thornton, 2005; Kibria, Makoto, & M., 2014; 
Matthews, 2009; Papacostas, 2014). In light of the lower productivity of the top-down approach 
in considering the community‘s involvement in environmental management, attention was given 
to designing a management tool that considers the active involvement of communities in the 
conservation of natural resources (Frasera, Dougilla, Mabeeb, Reeda, & McAlpinec, 2006; 
Kibria et al., 2014; Lawlor et al., 2013).  
CFM membership in the study area, the Bale Eco-region of Ethiopia, is in principle 
voluntary and everyone can become CFM member, but the procedure follows certain rules of 
eligibility such as geographic proximity to the forest area and length of time having lived in the 
village (Dubé & Schmithüsen, 2014). CFM members are a group of farmers (usually up to 30 
individuals in a group) who jointly manage the forest. These CFM groups are assigned a specific 
forest area to look after by the local government forest conservation office. A village creates as 
many of these groups as it can form depending on the size and carrying capacity of the forest 
area in their region. Finally, these groups are administered by one cooperative ―body‖ at the 
village level. The cooperative is the body responsible for distributing the benefits from the forest 
to the CFM members.  
The extant literature on trust is mostly concentrated around the discussion of cooperation 
at the individual level, such as if the trusting individuals are also cooperators (Bouma et al., 
2008; Johnson & Mislin, 2011). Meanwhile, the in- and out-group trust – that is, if individuals 
put equal trust in cooperators and in non-cooperators in a field experiment setting – have 
received scarce attention in the literature to date (Chaudhuri, Paichayontvijit, & Shen, 2013; 
Kugler, Bornstein, Kocher, & Sutter, 2007; Kugler, Kausel, & Kocher, 2012; Lane, 2016). To 





their identity known), studies have focused predominantly on the role of trust in decision-making 
as a group and as an individual in laboratory experiments. These groups are typically not natural 
groups but are constructed by the experimenter (the so-called minimal group design;  (Bornstein 
& Yaniv, 1998; Garza, Becker, & Kugler, 2011; Goette et al., 2012; Luhan, Kocher, & Sutter, 
2009; Wolf, Insko, Kirchner, & Wildschut, 2008). To our knowledge, there has been no four-
dimensional exploration of trust and trustworthiness, in and out of a group, that allows for the 
systematic interaction of all the players, where the players‘ identities are provided in the field 
setting. As will be explained below, I am able to do so because I use an extended version of the 
strategy method.   
Hence, this study differs from previous studies, specifically Chaudhuri et al. (2013); 
Kugler et al. (2007); Kugler et al. (2012), (Goette et al., 2012) in terms of the design, subject 
pool and due to the presence of different types in the sample. The design of this study does not 
allow for making decisions as a group, but rather as an individual. The experiment uses a 
combination of a between-subjects design and a within-subjects design in which the participants 
play a trust game both with a CFM member and a non-CFM member. Hence, the participants 
play the trust game twice, once with a CFM member and once with a non-CFM member. In 
addition, they make decisions both as a first mover (sender) and as a second mover (returner). As 
the identity of the participant (being a CFM member or not) is known, this design enables an 
investigation of the role of identity, i.e. CFM membership, on the decisions made in the game, in 
particular on the amounts sent as well as on the amounts returned.   
In light of this, the current study aims to examine the role of identity, specifically of 
being a cooperator, in relation to trust and trustworthiness. The working hypothesis is that given 
the high level of trust towards the participants in a collective action, the CFM members will 
receive higher payoffs. The expected channel is that the CFM members will send higher amounts 
but also that higher amounts will be returned to CFM members. 
This study finds the following results. First, both CFM members and non-CFM members 
send more money to CFM members (typically perceived as more cooperative types) than to non-
CFM members, but the difference is not statistically significant. Second, and interestingly, the 
non-CFM members, in general, send more than the CFM members. However, the difference in 





members. Thus, it seems that not only to whom the money is sent matters but also it is important 
to look at the identity of the sender, i.e. whether or not the sender belongs to the CFM group. 
Third, regarding returner decisions, we find that the CFM members and non-CFM members 
behaved differently with respect to the amount returned. The average share returned by CFM 
members is lower than the share returned by non-CFM members which is caused mainly by the 
behavior of CFM towards non-CFM members.  
These results support the hypothesis that higher trust is placed in individuals who 
contribute to real-world public good provision – CFM members. The CFM members receive 
more money than non-members, but they send and return less, specifically to non-members. 
CFM members thus benefit more from participating in the trust game than non-members. Note 
that the CFM members in the area are not considered more powerful than non-members since the 
benefits that a member derives from cooperation are more of intrinsic nature than objective 
benefits. For example, one can easily access fire wood and timber products from the market 
without sacrificing time and effort looking after the forest blocks, and instead, choose to spend 
more time on other (agricultural) activities. Moreover, as will be discussed in more detail later in 
the paper, we see that both the CFM and non-CFM members are equally engaged in other social 
interaction activities. Also note that in order to rule out the possibility of misunderstanding the 
game by the CFM members as an opportunity they can use to be rewarded for their everyday 
cooperative behavior, the experimenters have thoroughly explained that the final payoff of 
participants only depends on the decisions they make during the trust game.   
Hence, at first, it seems that there is some kind of paradox that although CFM members 
may trust non-CFM members less (and thus send less), the non-CFM members are in fact more 
trustworthy (return more). However, the findings suggest that the possible channel in which the 
cooperating types consistently derive higher payoffs is probably in line with Ostrom‘s revised 
theory of collective action. Nevertheless, we do not have a repeated trust game setting to fully 
claim these results the stable strategy in the long run. This can be addressed with future research. 
The policy relevance of this study relates to understanding pro-social behavior with 
relation to engagement in collective good management and maximizing the advantages that arise 
with it (see Bouma et al., 2008; Narloch et al., 2012; Papacostas, 2014). Recently, collective 





(Ostrom, 2010) through the implementation of REDD+ (Reduction of emission from 
deforestation and forest degradation) (Newton, Oldekop, Brodnig, Karna, & Agrawal, 2016; 
Pelletier, Gélinas, & Skutsch, 2016). Hence, understanding the functioning of trust and other pro-
social behavior among the ―local conservation groups‖ and other non-member individuals is 
crucial (i) to deepen our understanding of the role of pro-social behavior between cooperators 
and non-cooperators; (ii) to examine the prudence of collective level environmental 
management. By conducting a field experiment in a relevant study area, we attempt to learn and 
understand the behavior of people who are individually involved. 
4.2. Experimental Design, Procedure, and Hypotheses 
4.2.1 The Field  
The context of the study is the Bale Mountains Eco-region in Ethiopia (see Chapter 2 for 
more information).  
The sample in this study is taken from Dodola ―Woreda‖ (the lower administration level 
next to regional administration), out of which three villages were selected: Bura-Adelle, 
Kechema, and Geneta (see Figure 4.1). These villages were selected because they were among 
the first to implement forest management in the Bale Eco-region, and they are more accessible in 
terms of infrastructure. The three villages in this study (Bura-Adelle, Kechema, and Geneta) 
were selected because they are more accessible in terms of infrastructure, and more important for 
the current study, they were among the first to implement forest management in the Bale Eco-
region.   
CFM is a joint action by a group of farmers, in which one group contains up to 30 
individuals, to conserve the forest block assigned to them in their respective villages. All the 
groups in different villages are organized under one cooperative that is responsible for sharing 
the benefits accrued from forest products and from the hunting permitted in the forest. Members 
are in return rewarded from these benefits. In this study, although all the participants are forest 






Figure 4.1: Map of the study area. 
4.2.2 Experimental Design 
The experiment employed in this study is based on a trust game. In a standard two-player 
trust game, developed by Berg et al. (1995), both players are endowed with a certain amount of 
money. One player (Player 1, the trustor) has to decide how much of his endowment to send to 
another player (Player 2, the trustee). In its standard format, the amount sent by Player 1 is 
tripled by the experimenter and given to Player 2. Then, Player 2 has to decide how much of the 
amount received she wants to send back to Player 1. The payoffs for Player 1 are the amount 





to the amount she received minus the amount she sent back to Player 1.22 Using backward 
induction, standard economic theory predicts that Player 2 will not return any money, and thus 
Player 1 will also not send any money. Numerous studies have found, however, that both the 
amounts sent and amounts returned are positive, but also that decisions are affected by 
experimental parameters ((such as endowment, multiplication factor, etcetera,  see  Johnson & 
Mislin, 2011). 
In the experiment, I implement two changes compared to this standard trust game. First 
of all, in a standard trust game, subjects play only one role; that is, they are either the trustor 
(sender) or the trustee (returner/receiver). In the current experiment, each subject plays both 
roles. Second, rather than hot decision making, I apply the strategy method  (Selten, 1967), in 
which subjects have to make decisions for every situation that may arise – in this case, whether 
they are matched with a CFM member, or with a non-CFM member. In each role, players thus 
have to make two choices. In particular, in their role as Player 1, each subject has to make two 
decisions: (i) how much he wants to send to the other subject if the other subject is a 
Collaborative Forest Management (CFM) member, and (ii) how much he wants to send to the 
other subject if the other subject is not a Collaborative Forest Management member (non-CFM). 
The same approach is used for return decisions. That is, in their role as Player 2, each subject has 
to indicate how much he wants to send back to the other subject (i) if the other subject is a CFM 
member; (ii) if the other subject is a non-CFM member. Note that the use of the strategy method 
or the fact that subjects play both roles and make multiple decisions does not affect the game-
theoretic predictions based on standard, selfish and money-maximizing preferences. 
Experimental findings and insights from behavioral economics suggest, however, that both 
variations could have an impact on behavior.23 This should not matter for our experiment and 
results, as this study‘s aim is not in absolute levels but in (treatment) differences in behavior 
                                                            
22
 There are several variants of the standard trust game. One of the variations is to give Player 2 
no endowment or a positive endowment. We have chosen to not endow Player 2. 
23
 For example, Burks et al. (2003) find that playing both roles reduces both trust (the amount 
sent) and reciprocity (the amount returned). Casari and Cason (2009) report that the strategy 
method gives similar rates of trust but significantly lower rates of trustworthiness. Note, 
however, that in their study trustors could only send nothing or the full amount. Differences are 





towards CFM members and non-CFM members, and between CFM members and non-CFM 
members.  
The details of the experimental design are as follows (see Appendix 1 for the 
instructions). First, all subjects have to make two decisions as Player 1. Player 1 is given ETB50 
(which is half a day‘s wage) at the start of the game (Player 2 receives 0), and each Player 1 has 
to decide how much of the ETB50 he wants to send to Player 2. There were six possible choices: 
ETB0, ETB10, ETB20, ETB30, ETB40 and ETB50. As explained above, Player 1 has to make 
two decisions: how much she wants to send to Player 2 if Player 2 is a CFM member, and how 
much she wants to send to Player 2 if Player 2 is a non-CFM member. Then all subjects have to 
make decisions as Player 2. As Player 2, each subject has to decide for each of the possible 
amounts received, how much she wants to send back to Player 1. For example, if ETB10 is 
chosen by Player 1, Player 2 receives ETB30, and she can decide whether to send back ETB0, 
ETB10, ETB20 or ETB30. Also as Player 2, subjects have to make two series of six decisions: 
(i) how much money they want to send back to Player 1 if Player 1 is a CFM member 
conditional on that CFM member sending her 0, 10, 20, 30, 40 or 50 ETB, and (ii) how much 
they want to send back to Player 1 if Player 1 is a non-CFM member, for each of the 6 possible 
amounts they can receive.  
In order to make all choices‘ potential payoff relevant, the payoffs to each subject were 
based on random matching and random role assignment, which was done after all decisions had 
been made. First, after all, decisions had been made, pairs of two subjects were formed, and one 
subject in each pair was randomly assigned the role of Player 1 (trustor) and the other of Player 2 
(the trustee). Then for both subjects, it was checked if they were a CFM member or a non-CFM 
member, and this determined which of the decisions was implemented. So for example, suppose 
a CFM member was assigned the role of Player 1, who was matched with a non-CFM member 
playing the role of Player 2. Payoffs for both participants were then determined by (i) verifying 
how much the CFM member would be willing to send if she was matched with a non-CFM 
member (say 20 ETB), and (ii) looking up how much of the 60 ETB the non-CFM member 
would be willing to return if she was matched with a CFM member who would send him ETB 
20. All details of the experiment including the matching and the payment procedure were 





4.2.3 Experimental Procedure 
The experiment took place from January 8-10, 2016, in one of the lower administrations 
in the Bale Eco-region of Ethiopia. The participants in the experiment are forest-dependent 
individuals from three villages (Bura-Adelle, Kechema and Geneta). The invitation to subjects to 
participate in the experiment was made with the help of development agents from Oromia Forest 
and Wildfire Enterprise who work closely with forest-dependent communities in general and 
with CFM members in particular. The development agents asked the leaders within these villages 
to send 30 to 35 participants per village to the meeting/experiment; the sample had to include 
both CFM and non-CFM members.  
Upon the participants‘ arrival to the session, an introductory meeting was held in the 
open field (where they usually hold meetings), and the local development agent introduced the 
research team to the participants. Next, the research team informed the participants of the general 
objective of the research, followed by the experiment‘s instructions. Further explanation was 
given when necessary to make sure that the participants understood the procedure. Details of the 
decision-making were provided when players were interviewed individually, specifically 
concerning the possible choices they had when making decisions as a first mover and a second 
mover. Hence, after the joint instruction, the subjects were individually approached for a survey 
and to make decisions in the experiment.  
Subjects came forward to make their decisions one by one, and were invited to wait for 
the procedure to continue in an area that was physically separated from the area where the yet-to-
be-interviewed participants were waiting. Interviewing one participant took 15 minutes on 
average. There were four data collectors and interviewers including the researcher, without 
including the development agent who was the facilitator at the experiment site. Per village, the 
trust game experiment took on average two and half hours including time spent on explaining 
and illustrating the game as well as answering questions from the subjects.  
At the end of the experiment, after all the subjects were interviewed and made their 
decisions, the random assignment of a role was implemented. It was done so by using separate 
matching cards on which we filled in information such as card number, participant‘s membership 





member, and finally the amount to be returned for all possible amounts sent (0, 10, 20, 30, 40, 
50) to CFM and non-CFM members. After filling out all the information on the matching card, 
the cards were placed in a box and mixed together to enable the random matching. Matching was 
done in such a way that by definition the first card picked was assigned the role of Player 1, 
while the second card picked was assigned the role of Player 2. Then, the information on the 
cards was used to see whether players were matched with a CFM or non-CFM member and 
implemented the appropriate decisions of both players to calculate the payoffs. The matching 
was done anonymously but in front of the participants. Finally, the participants were called 
forward to collect their money based on the decision they made. Note that the final payoffs 
depended on actual CFM membership status of the person a subject was paired with, such that 
subjects had an incentive to use their true preferences and beliefs (which may be different when 
they are matched with CFM or non-CFM members). Decision-makers did not get a chance to 
know the person with whom they were matched, and their identity was kept anonymous. 
 
4.2.4 Hypotheses 
The main question that is addressed in this study is whether trust and trustworthiness 
depend on the identity of the person (being a CFM member or not) and/or on the identity of the 
person she is matched with. Based on the discussion in the introduction, several testable null 
hypotheses can be formulated.  
H1: CFM members send the same amount as non-CFM members. 
This hypothesis can be divided into two sub-hypotheses in two ways, thus resulting in four 
testable hypotheses: 
H1a: CFM members send the same amount to CFM members and to non-CFM members; 
H1b: Non-CFM members send the same amount to CFM members and to non-CFM members. 
H1c: CFM members and non-CFM members send the same amount to CFM members; 





As argued in the introduction, there may be (at least) two reasons why one may expect 
behavior to be different. The first reason follows from social identity theory (Tajfel, 1974), 
which suggests that people have more affinity with in-group members than with out-group 
members, and as a result they will treat in-group members more favorably. In the current setting, 
this theory predicts that CFM members will send higher amounts if they are matched with CFM 
members than if they are matched with non-CFM members, whereas non-CFM members will 
send higher amounts to non-CFM members. Ostrom‘s theory of collective action, on the other 
hand, assumes that there are (at least) two types of agents, selfish types and (conditional) 
cooperators where cooperators are more likely to display pro-social behavior than selfish 
agents.24 Assuming that CFM members are the more cooperative type, this theory would predict 
that CFM members at first send more to CFM members and to non-CFM members. 
Combined with the assumption that CFM members are the more cooperative type, thus 
more trusted, this theory would predict that CFM members receive higher amounts than non-
CFM members, irrespective of the identity of the sender. As both theories offer some different 
alternative hypotheses, the experimental data can be used to test which one is most appropriate. 
For example, both theories suggest that hypothesis H1b will be rejected, but Ostrom‘s theory 
predicts that non-CFM members send more to CFM members whereas social identity theory 
does not. Similarly, while Ostrom‘s theory suggests that H1c will not be rejected (as amount sent 
to CFM members is the same), social identity theory predicts that it will be rejected (as CFM 
members send more to CFM members).  
In a similar vein, null hypotheses for the amount returned can be derived as the 
following;  
H2: CFM members return the same share as non-CFM members. 
Again this hypothesis can be divided into four testable sub-hypotheses: 
                                                            
24
 According to Ostrom‘s theory,  cooperators are not only more likely to display pro-social 
behavior than selfish agents at first but in the longer run also end up receiving higher payoffs 
because they are more trusted. Since the time frame in the experiment is very short, we do not 






H2a: CFM members return the same share to CFM members and to non-CFM members; 
H2b: non-CFM members return the same share to CFM members and to non-CFM members. 
H2c: CFM members and non-CFM members return the same share to CFM members; 
H2d: CFM members and non-CFM members return the same share to non-CFM members. 
Here again, social identity theory and Ostrom‘s theory may offer some conflicting 
hypotheses. For example, the first would predict that non-CFM members would return more to 
non CFM members than to CFM members, whereas the latter would predict the opposite.    
4.3. Results 
4.3.1. The Sample 
Table 4.1 presents the descriptive statistics of the participants of each village in the 
experiment and balance tests of covariates using orthogonality tests. There were 96 participants 
from the three villages. Note that these are the same individuals as those who participated in the 
Valuation paper (Kitessa, 2017). The three villages have household compositions that are quite 
similar in terms of various characteristics, alongside the geographical one. Table 1 shows that in 
all the villages the participants in the experiments are predominantly male. This is probably 
because of the cultural setting in which, as the household head, the male is more likely to attend 
meetings. In a similar way, except for one village (Village 1), more than half of the sample 
population have a family size of 10 members or more in one household. In all of the villages, 
only 20% of the households have families with fewer than four members. This shows that the 
study area is characterized by large families and the average number of children is much higher 
than the country‘s average of 4.1 children per household.  
In the sample, the reported average income of the households ranges from 2,500 ETB to 
slightly above 4,500 ETB per month, and the reported land size in hectares is 2.47 on average 











Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics  
Variable Village 1 
 
Village 2 Village 3 (1) vs. 
(2) 




Male (%) 0.853 0.875 1.000 -0.022  -0.147** -0.125** 0.102 
  (0.062) (0.059) (0.000) (0.086) (0.066) (0.061) 
Family size of 4 
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Family size of 11 





























        





















below 25 years of 
age (%) 
(0.029) (0.000) (0.033) (0.030) (0.044) (0.032) 
  
Participants 
within age group 
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members of Dabo 
(%) 
(0.049) (0.089) (0.091) (0.100) (0.100) (0.127) 
  
Call Dabo two 
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than two times 

















































34 32 30 66 64 62  
               Standard deviation in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
It is also important to note some between-village differences. In village 3, both income 
and the hectares of land owned are on average much higher than in the other two villages. It is 
sensible that average income is higher where the size of land owned is relatively higher, given 
that almost all the participants are farmers.  
Less than 3% of participants in the experiment are within the age bracket of 25 years and 
below. In fact, the majority are adults of 35 years of age and above. The younger age group (25-
35 years) accounts for about 26% of the participants.  
With regard to participants‘ literacy status, about half of the participants have up to 5 





villages. Thus, the sample of this study predominantly consists of farmers with low literacy 
status who are also forest dependents. Other variables will be discussed in later sections.  
In general, although some differences exist between the villages, the sample is rather 
balanced in terms of observable characteristics. Importantly, even though we control for village 
differences later in the analysis, we do not believe that the differences between the villages 
matter, as we are interested in the effect of identity (treatment differences). 
4.3.2. Experimental Results  
4.3.2.1 Descriptive statistics and non-parametric test results 
Table 4.2 presents the summary statistics of the trust game. This table reports the average 
amount sent by Player 1 in case she is matched with a CFM member and also for the case she is 
matched with a non-CFM member. Similarly, the average amount returned by Player 2, for all 
(possible) discrete values that were initially sent by Player1, are shown in the table. These 
decisions (on how much to send as Player 1 and to return as Player 2) were made twice, with 
respect to a CFM member and a non-CFM member. Column 1 presents the average amount sent 
(returned) to CFM members, while column 2 reports the average amount sent (returned) to non-
CFM members. The last column shows the p-values of Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks 
test comparing the two values. 
The first and second column of Table 4.2 show that on average, the mean amount sent by 
Player 1 is 15.70, which is about 31.40% of the initial endowment. This measures the trust level. 
To get some idea about the trust level in this study, it can be compared with the trust levels 
observed in various other studies. It turns out that compared to all regions of the world, this 
average is rather low, even though some variation across studies and regions can be observed 
(see Table 4.3). This relatively small amount sent seems to be in line with the previous finding 
that trust is lower in African countries compared to other regions of the world (see the meta-
study by Johnson and Mislin, 2011). The same two columns in Table 4.2 also show that the 
average amount sent to CFM members is almost 1.5 as high as the average amount sent to non-
CFM members (18.64 versus 12.76). A Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test shows that 





Table 4.2: Summary statistics of trust game 







Mean amount sent by 
Player 1 
18.64 (10.22) 12.76 (8.14) 0.000 
Mean amount returned by Player 2 
if trustor sends 10 12.55 (6.53) 11.09 (5.77) 0.043 
if trustor sends 20 22.92 (11.96) 20.00 (11.69) 0.008 
if trustor sends 30 35.89 (18.97) 31.88 (17.09) 0.034 
if trustor sends 40 48.54 (24.41) 41.46 (26.03) 0.004 
if trustor sends 50 57.29 (30.80) 51.61 (30.04) 0.023 
Share amount returned by Player 2 
if trustor sends 10 0.418 (0.22) 0.369 (0.19) 0.049 
if trustor sends 20 0.382 (0.20) 0.333 (0.19) 0.007 
if trustor sends 30 0.399 (0.21) 0.354 (0.19) 0.035 
if trustor sends 40 0.405 (0.21) 0.345 (0.22) 0.003 
if trustor sends 50 0.382 (0.21) 0.344 (0.02) 0.022 
Average share returned 0.397 0.349 0.000 
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses; last column indicates the p-values of statistical tests of 
difference in values reported in the second and third columns (Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks tests). 
 
The amounts and shares returned by Player 2 to CFM and non-CFM members are also 
reported in Table 4.2. It should be noted that for all possible values that Player 2 received, they 
decided to return on average at least 30 percent. Taking averages of shares returned at all levels, 
the overall average share is about 0.35, which is slightly greater than the shares returned in some 
parts of the world (see Table 4.3). Interestingly, comparing the shares returned in columns 1 and 
2 of Table 4.2, we observe that for all possible amounts sent, a higher share is returned to a CFM 





the 5% level, at least. This shows that the CFM members received consistently and significantly 
higher returns on their initial investments.  
 
Table 4.3: Fraction sent and returned in trust games by region 
Variable name Obs. Sum N Mean Std. dev. Min Max 
Panel A: Fraction sent (trust) 
All regions 161 23,900 0.502 0.124 0.224 0.885 
North America 46 4579 0.517 0.158 0.259 0.885 
Europe 64 9030 0.537 0.121 0.224 0.783 
Asia 23 3043 0.482 0.102 0.285 0.710 
South America 13 4733 0.458 0.074 0.336 0.857 
Africa 15 2515 0.456 0.133 0.300 0.750 
This study  To CFM 96 0.373 0.204 0.000 1.000 
To non-CFM 96 0.254 0.163 0.000 1.000 
Panel B: Proportion returned (trustworthiness) 
All regions 137 21,529 0.372 0.114 0.108 0.812 
North America 41 4324 0.340 0.089 0.119 0.496 
Europe 53 7596 0.382 0.094 0.108 0.542 
Asia 15 2361 0.460 0.114 0.215 0.597 
South America 13 4733 0.369 0.147 0.184 0.812 
Africa 15 2515 0.319 0.106 0.180 0.514 
This study To CFM 96 0.397 0.178 0.000 1.000 
To non-CFM 96 0.349 0.168 0.000 1.000 
 Source: (Johnson & Mislin, 2011). The number of observations (obs.) is the number of 
studies reported in the meta-study. 
 
Next, I consider the role of identity by breaking down the cooperators‘ and non-
cooperators‘ behavior. We do so by examining the amounts sent by subjects who are CFM 
members and those who are non-CFM members. Table 4.4 shows that both the CFM and non-





these differences are highly significant (p < 0.01, Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test). 
Furthermore, non-CFM members send on average about 2.5 ETB more than the CFM members. 
However, the results from a Mann-Whitney U test indicate that the difference is not statistically 
significant when the receiver is a CFM member, whereas it is highly significant when the 
receiver is a non-CFM member (p = 0.002, Mann-Whitney U tests). 
s 
Table 4.4: Amount sent to CFM and non-CFM by CFM membership status (Identity) 
 Amount sent to 
CFM 
 






    














    
p-values 
(Mann-Whitney U test)  
0.51 0.002  
Observations 62 34  
 
Taken together, these results support our hypothesis that CFM members are viewed as 
more trustworthy than non-CFM members, not only by fellow CFM members but also by non-
CFM members. At the same time, however, non-CFM members send more than CFM members, 
regardless of the membership status of Player 2, which suggests that they trust more.  
A graphical summary of the decision-making allows us to document the divergence in 
behavior between the two groups in more detail. Figure 4.2 presents the histograms of the 
amounts sent in the trust game by the CFM and non-CFM members, in the right panel and left 
panel, respectively. According to Figure 4.2, the distributions of the amounts sent to CFM 
members by both CFM and non-CFM members differ slightly from the distributions of the 
amounts sent to non-CFM members. For instance, the distribution of amounts sent to non-CFM 
(by both CFM and non-CFM) is more right skewed and shows a central tendency on a lower 





rather normal distribution. Interestingly, both CFM and non-CFM behaved in a relatively similar 
way towards CFM members. Thus, the distributions of amounts sent in this experiment differ in 
shapes based on with whom the participants were matched (CFM vs. non-CFM). This claim is 
also supported by the formal test of difference in distributions. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test 
shows that there is no difference in distributions between the amounts sent to CFM by CFM and 
non-CFM- the first panel. And Kolmogorov-Smirnov test shows no statistical difference in 
distributions between the amounts sent to non-CFM by CFM and non-CFM- the second panel. 
Thus, though between-subject decision distributions, i.e. the amounts sent to CFM and to non-
CFM differ, there is no difference in within-subject decision distributions, i.e., amounts sent to 
CFM by CFM and non-CFM vs amounts sent to non-CFM by CFM and non-CFM. 




So far I have determined that the differences in amounts sent are related both to the 
identity of Player 1 (CFM member or not) as well as to the characteristics of Player 2 (CFM 
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important, but we would like to know if the observed differences are really related to CFM 
membership or could also be due to people‘s involvement in other types of cooperative 
behaviors. To find out whether measures of other cooperative action could also play a role, we 
asked subjects about their participation in different forms of real-world social interaction.  
The hypothesis here is that the rate of one‘s involvement in related social and economic 
cooperation differs between CFM and non-CFM members. If that is the case, the observed 
differences in the amounts sent and returned in the trust game may be due to those differences 
rather than to the CFM membership. To test this hypothesis we examine how the participants‘ 
involvement relating to social cooperation within the community varies across CFM and non-
CFM members. We consider three measures of social interaction. The first is the number of 
times per year that a participant is involved in labor sharing (exchange) in relation to farm 
activities. Involvement of individuals in this labor sharing activity is locally known as ―Dabo,‖ 
and it is one of the three traditional types of social interaction in the study area (Ruben & Heras, 
2012). The second type of cooperation is called ―Ikub,‖ which is a traditional saving association 
in which members make regular contributions to a common fund. And the third type of 
cooperation is ―Idir,‖ which is a group (or social) support system in which people voluntary 
become members to help each other, specifically in times of deaths and funerals.  
Table 4.5 shows the subjects‘ involvement in different social interaction activities 
including Dabo by their CFM membership status. See also Table 4.2 for the summary statistics 
of these cooperation measures, namely Dabo, Ikub and Idir, across the villages in our sample. 
The variable Dabo takes the values 0, 1 and 2. On average, CFM members do just slightly less 
than one Dabo activity per year, whereas non-CFM members do on average 2/3 activity.  
Nevertheless, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no difference between CFM and non-CFM 
members (Fisher‘s exact test, p = 0.14). 
The middle column in Table 4.5 shows that the percentage of subjects‘ participation in 
Ikub is rather low in general and the rate does not differ for CFM-members and non-CFM 
members (Fisher‘s exact test gives p = 0.29). To some extent, the same applies to the last type of 
cooperation, ―Idir.‖ The difference in Idir participation between CFM and non-CFM members is 






Table 4.5: Participants’ involvement in cooperative activities by CFM membership status 
Actual CFM 
membership 
Dabo per year 





    
non-CFM member 0.65 0.26 0.62 
CFM member 0.93 0.19 0.58 
p-values (Fisher‘s 
Exact) 
0.144 0.289 0.448 
 
Hence, since as there is no evidence that these cooperative activities differ between CFM 
and non-CFM members, the conclusion is that the observed differences in amounts sent are 
mainly due to CFM membership and not due to other types of community involvements. This 
conclusion is supported if we consider the amounts sent and returned in more detail. Table 4.6 
confirms that the decisions on the amount sent are by and large unaffected by any of the three 
other social cooperation status, while amounts sent to CFM members are systematically higher 
than amounts sent to non-CFM members, and this behavior is irrespective of the cooperation 
type.  
Table 4.6: Amount sent (all) by other cooperation measures 






Idir Member 19.12 12.63 57 
Non-member 17.95 12.82 39 
p-values  (Mann-Whitney U test)                   0.482 0.616  
Dabo  
 
Cooperator 18.09 12.86 63 
Non-cooperator 19.69 12.42 33 
p-values (Mann-Whitney U test) 0.440                                     0.827 
      Ikub 
 
Member 19.05 14.76 21 





Being engaged in these other types of social interactions seems to have no effect on the 
amount sent to CFM members and non-CFM members. Thus, this supports our claim that the 
identity of the participant (being a CFM member) and the identity of the receiver are the 
predominant predictors of trust in this model. 
Next, let us have a closer look at returner behavior. As can be seen from Table 4.2, the 
more Player1 sends, the more is returned by Player 2 on average. Moreover, on average, for 
every amount sent, at least the initial absolute amount sent was returned on average, and as a 
result, the mean amount returned (19.89) is higher than the mean amount sent (16.25). A second 
measure to look at is the share returned, i.e. the amount returned divided by amount received. 
The mean share returned to both CFM and non-CFM together is 0.37, and shares do not seem to 
vary much with the amount received. This fraction is similar to the proportions Johnson and 
Mislin (2011) found in their meta-analysis for most regions (see panel B in Table 4.3), but 
slightly higher than average trustworthiness in Africa. Hence, amount returned is a decreasing 
percentage of amounts tripled.  
Furthermore, the mean percentage returned drops from 39.75% when returned to CFM to 
34.86% in the case of non-CFM. Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks tests show that for each 
of the different amounts sent by Player 2 – that is, 10, 20, 30, 40 and 50 – we can reject the 
hypothesis that the shares returned to CFM and non-CFM are the same (all p-values are below 
0.05). Using the amounts returned instead of the shares gives (of course) similar results. Hence 
we can conclude that there is a significant statistical difference between the shares (or amounts) 
returned to CFM members and to non-CFM members. 
Finally, I examine whether the membership status of Player 2 (being a CFM member or 
not) affects trustworthiness. To that end, Table 4.7 shows the average shares returned by CFM 
membership status. CFM members return on average less (30.635) than non-CFM members 
(38.205). The results of Mann-Whitney U tests show that CFM members and non-CFM members 
return similar amounts to CFM members, with the exception of the case in which 50 is sent (see 
Appendix 4). This stands in sharp contrast to behavior towards non-CFM members. For all 











possible amounts, the results of Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks tests show that there is a 
statistically significant difference in amounts returned to non-CFM members and to CFM 
members (p < 0.02 in all instances, Table 4.2). So the difference in amounts returned by CFM 
and non-CFM members is entirely driven by differences in trustworthiness towards non-CFM 
members.  
Related to this is the finding that CFM members return significantly different amounts to 
CFM members than to non-CFM members for all possible amounts sent (such that also the 
average shares differ significantly, see Table 4.7), whereas, for non-CFM members, there is no 
statistically significant difference between the amounts returned to both groups.  
Table 4.7: Amount returned to CFM and non-CFM member 
 Average share 
returned to CFM 




ranks test ) 
 
    















(Mann-Whitney U test) 
0.147 0.001  
Observations 62 34  
Note: We also have looked at a further classification of the second mover behavior in the 
following manner; consider amounts returned for all possible amount sent (0, 10, 20, 30, 50, 50) 
and define the following categories of behavior: Selfish: return always 0, Altruist: return always 
amount received (i.e. three times amount sent), Equal split: return always half of the amount 
received, Reciprocal: return at least amount sent, Weakly increasing: return non-decreasing 
amounts: R(X) ≥ R(X-10) where X is amount sent increasing, Other: any other behavior (see 
Appendix 5 for details). The huge majority behave in a reciprocal manner, or can considered to 
be conditional cooperators: for any amount sent they return at least that amount. Moreover, the 
analysis shows that both CFM and non-CFM members reciprocate more when matched with a 
CFM member than when matched with a non-CFM member.  
Graphically and more detailed information on the reciprocation decisions taking into 





average share returned in the trust game to the CFM and non-CFM members (right panel and left 
panel, respectively), by non-CFM and CFM members (left figure and right figure, respectively). 
The distribution of average share returned to non-CFM members (by both CFM and non-CFM 
members) seems to differ only slightly from the distribution of the amounts returned to CFM. 
The difference is more observable when the amounts returned to CFM and non-CFM members 
are examined by the identity of participants (CFM vs. non-CFM). Clearly, CFM members 
behaved differently towards both parties. Interestingly, the non-CFM also behaved slightly in a 
different fashion in making the decision of average share returned to CFM and non-CFM 
members. As a result, the distributions of average share returned to CFM members by CFM and 
non-CFM members seem to vary. However, that difference is not statistically significant 
(Kolmogorov-Smirnov test), while the difference in the distributions of average share returned to 






Figure 4.3: Histogram of average share returned to CFM members and non-CFM 




The experimental results above indicate that CFM members send and return more to 
fellow CFM members than to non-CFM members. Non-CFM members send more to CFM 
members relative to the amounts sent to non-CFM members too. As a result, people who are 
considered the cooperative type are also more likely to derive higher payoffs, which is in line 
with the Ostrom‘s theory of collective action. 
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 The reported share returned here is the average share returned over all possible amounts sent 
by the Player 1 (30, 60, 90, 120, 150). Since the strategy method is utilized, the further 
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 A further analysis of regressions (Table 4.8) seems to confirm that these results are not 
changed when we control for individual specific characteristics. The results are presented using 
standard OLS regression, where the standard errors are clustered at the village level.  
Table 4.8: Trust regression 
 Amount sent to CFM 
(OLS) 
Amount sent to non-CFM 
(OLS) 
CFM member=1 3.635 -2.658
*
 
 (3.127) (0.795) 
Age (>35) 1.161 1.669 
 (0.943) (1.236) 
Education (#Years>6) 5.902 3.445 
 (3.754) (4.088) 
House type 2.225 -5.841 
 (1.586) (2.525) 
Gender 0.713 -3.110 




 (0.0000483) (0.000475) 
Land size (hectares) -0.563 0.870 
 (1.695) (0.870) 
Village FE YES YES 






 (1.005) (2.504) 
Observations 96 96 
Adjusted R
2
 0.192 0.096 






Column 1 of Table 4.8 presents predictors of the amount sent to CFM members. Income 
seems to explain the amount sent to CFM members. Most importantly, as in the non-parametric 
tests, the regression (column 1) shows that the amount sent to a CFM member does not depend 
on membership status. In other words, amounts sent to the cooperators by players of both 
identities are statistically not different from each other.  
Column 2 (Table 4.8) shows predictors of the amount sent to non-CFM members. CFM 
membership seems to explain the difference in the amounts sent to non-CFM members namely, 
CFM members sent significantly lower amounts than non-CFM. Hence, being a non-cooperator 
is correlated with a lower amount sent by the cooperator, thus reflecting low trust towards the 
non-cooperators.  
However, it is not straightforward to make causal inference of CFM membership and the 
outcome variables. Causality requires experiment-like settings, i.e. taking CFM as a treatment 
variable with the similar characteristics of individuals across CFM membership balanced. In 
other words, causality requires CFM membership to be an exogenous variable. If the 
characteristics of individuals across CFM membership are not similar, which may be the case 
here (see Appendix 2), they should thus be balanced to claim causality.  
In appendix 2, the endogenous regression model is used to test of endogeneity of a binary 
variable, CFM membership. It does so by allowing for a specific correlation structure between 
the unobservables that affect the binary variable and the unobservables that affect the potential 
outcomes. If an unobserved variable affects which group a person gets to be in and affects the 
outcome as well, we have an endogeneity problem. Table B1 in Appendix 2 presents endogenous 
regressions. Column 1 and 2 indicate the regressions of amount sent to CFM and non-CFM 
respectively. The bottom panels of the columns show the first stage regression in which 
probability of CFM is predicted. While the top panel of the regressions shows the role of being a 
CFM on the amounts sent. In both column 1 and 2 of the table, the likelihood-ratio tests in the 
last row indicate that we can reject the null hypothesis of no correlation between the original 
assignment of CFM variable errors and the amounts sent errors. The negative relationships show 
that unobservables that raise the amounts sent tend to occur with unobservables that lower CFM 
membership.  





confounded with other variables, obtaining the ATE (Average Treatment Effect). This was done 
by using inverse probability weight treatment estimators. Using these estimators, which balance 
covariates across CFM membership, Table 4.9 presents the ATE of being a CFM member on the 
outcome variables (amounts sent). 
Table 4.9: ATE of CFM membership on trust 
 Sent to CFM 
 
Sent to non-CFM 
ATE   
1vs 0.  CFM -0.479 -4.823** 
 (2.337) (1.930) 
POmean   
0.  CFM 18.42*** 15.72*** 
 (1.973) (1.745) 
TME1   
Age (>35) 1.246** 1.246** 
 (0.541) (0.541) 
House type -1.478*** -1.478*** 
 (0.553) (0.553) 
Land size 0.441** 0.441** 
 (0.185) (0.185) 
Constant -0.529 -0.529 
 (0.590) (0.590) 
Observations 96 96 
Over identification test 
(Prob > chi2)    
0.6805 0.6805 
               Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Table 4.9 shows the ATE after balancing covariates between the CFM and non-CFM 
group. Typically, ATE measures the role of a treatment if everyone in the sample is put under 
that treatment. Column 1 of Table 4.9 indicates that being a CFM member lowers the amount 
sent to a fellow CFM member by 0.50 cents from the average of 18.42 ETB sent by a non-CFM 
member. This difference, clearly, is not statistically significant. In the same way, column 2 of 
Table 4.9 shows that being a CFM member lowers the amount sent to a non-CFM member by 
4.82ETB from the average of 15.72ETB sent by a non-CFM member. The difference in the 
amount sent to a non-CFM member by the two types is statistically significant.  
 
As mentioned above, the ATE in this model is calculated by balancing covariates across 





the CFM and non-CFM group. The over-identification test of covariates shows that we cannot 
reject the null hypothesis that states that covariates are balanced (Prob > Chi2 = 0.6805). 
Therefore, these results support the findings of the non-parametric test that the CFM members 
tend to send lower amounts in general and much lower amounts to non-CFM members in 
particular. 
 
Examination of the subjects‘ behavior with respect to the amount returned 
(trustworthiness) using regressions is presented in Table 4.10. Table 4.10 also utilizes inverse 
probability estimators. The ATE after balancing covariates across the CFM group indicates the 
magnitude of the causal relationship between CFM membership and the share returned.  
In column 1 (Table 4.10), where the output variable is the decision of the share returned 
to a CFM member, the average share returned by fellow CFM members is 0.043 cents lower than 
an average of 0.43 cents, the share returned by the non-CFM members. Clearly, this difference is 
not statistically significant, and the average shares returned by the members and non-members do 
not differ from each other, in line with the non-parametric test. On the other hand, as column 2 of 
the table shows, the share returned to non-CFM members is 0.11 cents lower than 0.42, the share 
returned by non-CFM members. Again, CFM members returned on average lower shares 
compared to the shares returned by non-CFM members. In this case, the difference is statistically 
significant.  
Table 4.10: ATE of CFM membership on trustworthiness 
 (1) (2) 
 Returned to CFM Returned to non-CFM 
ATE   
r1vs0.  CFM -0.0428 -0.113*** 
 (0.0383) (0.0382) 
POmean   
r0.  CFM 0.426*** 0.424*** 
 (0.0328) (0.0335) 
   
Age (>35) 1.246** 1.246** 
 (0.541) (0.541) 
House type -1.478*** -1.478*** 
 (0.553) (0.553) 
Land size 0.441** 0.441** 





Constant -0.529 -0.529 
 (0.590) (0.590) 
Observations 96 96 
Over identification test (Prob > chi2) 0.6805 0.6805 
Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
The reliability of the results (share returned) under this model is examined by conducting 
the balance test of covariates by CFM membership. The test of over-identification shows that the 
covariates are balanced. Thus, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the covariates are 
balanced (Prob > chi2 = 0.6805). ATE results are in line with the main findings, and confirm that 
CFM members tend to return lower amounts in general and much lower to non-CFM members. 
As a result, CFM members earn consistently higher payoffs than non-CFM members. Although 
the higher payoffs are in line with Ostrom‘s theory, some other findings on trustee behavior are 
not. In particular, the alternative hypothesis following from this theory, that cooperative subjects 
display more pro-social behavior (and thus return more) is not supported. 
4.4. Conclusions 
This study examines trust and trustworthiness between members of a certain group and 
non-members (CFM and non- CFM members). In settings like this, different theories can be 
considered to predict the outcomes of matching a certain group members (both with each other 
and non- members) for economic decision making.  
Since the amount sent and returned are designed within the setting of between group 
member and non-group member decision making, the prediction of social identity theory (see 
Tajfel, 1974),  could be the strategy taken by the subjects. Social identity theory predicts that 
people favor their fellow in-group member than non-group member if matched in decision 
making. 
Another way to understand in group-out group biases is to look at if these biases have 
also their beginning originated in indirect evolution theory. Following numerous evidence of 
conditional cooperators in public good provision and the implication thereof, Ostrom (2014) 
recommended a revised theory of collective action. This theory uses the indirect evolutionary 
approach to examine the evolution of conditional cooperators and the role of pro-social 





the objective payoff of a certain decision into an intrinsic value that is in line with their norms, 
on which they base their final decision.  
In the same theory, there are at least two types of agents – cooperators and selfish agents. 
And where information about the types of agents is provided, the conditional cooperators will 
consistently receive a higher payoff. Meanwhile, the selfish agents will receive consistently 
lower payoff since they are not trusted. Because of the higher payoff, only the cooperators will 
survive with the complete information process (Ostrom, 2000). 
This study tested trust and trustworthiness between CFM and non-CFM member by 
providing complete information on the types of players in the trust game. I find that trust and 
trustworthiness are indeed affected by both the characteristics of a player on whom these traits 
are bestowed and the identity of a bestower. Characteristics of the bestowed, such as being a 
member of a CFM and thus a cooperator, tend to increase trust towards her/him. However, the 
CFM members seem to not reciprocate as would conventionally be expected, thus exhibiting low 
trust towards the senders, specifically the non-CFM members. 
In summary, I find that CFM members may trust non-CFM members less (and thus send 
less), but in fact, non-CFM are more trustworthy (return more). Thus, a higher amount is sent to 
CFM members, which shows that they are more trusted. Interestingly, it seems that the non-CFM 
members tend to signal the CFM members that they can be trusted by sending an even higher 
amount than what the fellow CFM member sent on average. However, their trust was not 
reciprocated. The findings in this study seem to be as predicted by Ostrom‘s collective action 
theory, that is, as time passes, the conditional cooperators are trusted more and will consistently 
receive a higher payoffs, while non-cooperators will receive lower payoffs (because they are less 
trusted).  However, we do not have repeated trust game setting to fully claim whether this 
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APPENDIX 1: Questionnaires and Experimental Design Guidelines 
 
                                                                           Name of Interviewer _____________________ 
Date ___________________________________ 
Code of Respondent ______________________ 
       Interview Started at ______________________ 
    Interview Ended at _______________________ 
 
 
Good morning/afternoon! Thank You in advance for making time for the interview. I am 
_________________________, an interviewer for this survey. The survey was designed by 
Rahel J. Kitessa, who is studying at Tilburg University in The Netherlands. Currently, she is 
collecting data for research purposes. You are kindly requested to give information that we will 





increase the understanding about the problems in utilization of the forest and other related natural 
resources. Whatever information you provide will be kept strictly confidential. 
Part I 
General Survey Questions 
1. Please indicate your gender. 
a. Female                                         b.       Male 
2. Please indicate your age group.       
                  a. 18-25                         d. 46-55 
                  b. 26-35                         e. 56 + 
                  c. 36-45 
3. Are you the head of your household? 
a. Yes  b. No 
 
4. What is the highest level of formal education you received? 
a. No formal education          c. Grade 7-8 
b. Grade 1-6                           d. Grade 9-12                  e. Above grade 12                  
5. How many members are there in your household?  
a. 1-4                 b. 5-7                         c. 8-9   d. 10 or more 
 
6. Who owns the house that you are living in? 
a. It is our own house     b.  It is a rented house 
7. Would you please tell me the range corresponding to your total monthly income? 
a. Below 500 Birr   c. 500- 1000 Birr  
b.  1001-2000 Birr    d. 20001-3000 Birr  e. 3001-4000 Birr  f. Above 4000 Birr 
8. What is/are the source(s) of your income? 
a. Agriculture   b. Forest and its products     c. Police      d. Daily laborer  
e. Business owner        f. Other________________ 





a. Oromo             
b. Amhara                    
c. Other        
d. Do not wish to report 
10. Do you have land of your own? 
a. Yes                                                           
b. No 
11. What is the total land area that you can cultivate (land that you own plus land that you 
rent)? ___________________hectare(s) 
12. Do you consider your land as quality land? 
a. Yes                                                           
b. No 
13. Are you a member of Collaborative Forest Management (CFM)? 
a. Yes                                                           
b. No   
14. If your answer for Q. 13 is ―yes,‖ why did you become a member of CFM? 
___________________________________________________________________ 
15. If your answer for Q.13 is ―no,‖ why didn‘t you become a member of CFM? 
____________________________________________________________________ 
16. How do you accomplish the farming activities during peak high season including sowing 
and harvesting time? 
a) Hire labor      
b) Call for Dabo         
c) Do it with members of my household 
17. Do you go to Dabo often?  
a. Yes                       
b.  No 
18. Are you a member of Ikub 
a. Yes     
b. No 
19. Are you a member of Idir? 
a. Yes     
b.  No 
20. Were you born in Bale? 
a) Yes                                              
b)  No 





21. How do you evaluate the seriousness of forest degradation and climate change in the 
country? 
a) Very serious          
b)  Serious             
c) Not that serious 
d) Not serious at all                               
e) I don‘t know      
22. Do you think you have an influence on decision-making in managing your forest together 
with members? 
a) Yes                                                          
b)  No 
23.  Please indicate your religion. 
a. Muslim             
b.  Christian                    
c. Other        
d. Do not wish to report 
Part II: The Experiment’s Guidelines 
1. Instruction session:  
Welcome to all of you. Now we will give instructions about a game you will play in a moment. 
In the game you may earn some money. There are no winners and losers in the game, but how 
much you earn will depend on how you and other people play the game. The objective of the 
game is purely research and the money for the game is provided by Tilburg University in the 
Netherlands.  
Now I would like to explain the game to you. In the game there are two groups. Players in one 
group are called PLAYER 1, players in the other group are called PLAYER 2. During the 
interview you will not know whether you will be assigned the role of PLAYER 1 or the role of 
PLAYER 2. Therefore, you will first be asked to make a decision as PLAYER 1. Then you will 
be asked to make a decision as PLAYER 2.  
Once everybody has made their decisions, it will randomly be decided which role you will be 





implemented. You will be matched with a person who has been assigned the role of PLAYER 2. 
If you are assigned the role of PLAYER 2 your decision as PLAYER 2 will be implemented. In 
that case you will be matched with a person who has been assigned the role of PLAYER 1. You 
will not learn who the person is with whom you are matched, and the other person will not learn 
your identity either. Nobody will know with whom you play the game and which decisions you 
have made.  
Now, let us look at the decisions you have to make in the game, depending on whether you will 
be assigned the role of PLAYER 1 or of PLAYER 2. First, we will look at the decision PLAYER 
1 has to make. PLAYERS 1 are given ETB50 to start the game with. That means that PLAYER 1 
starts the game and decides how much of the ETB50 he or she will send to PLAYER 2. All the 
money PLAYER 1 does NOT send to PLAYER 2 will be paid to PLAYER 1. All the money 
PLAYER 1 sends to PLAYER 2 will be tripled by the organizers. Next, PLAYER 2 has to 
decide how much of the money he or she received that he will give back to PLAYER 1, and how 
much of the money he will keep for him/herself.  
 PLAYER 1 thus receives the amount of money he or she kept at the beginning of the 
game, plus the amount PLAYER 2 sends back to PLAYER 1. 
 PLAYER 2 receives the amount of money he or she received from PLAYER 1 (which 
was tripled by the experimenter), minus the amount he or she sent back to PLAYER 1. 
Consider the following examples. 
 Suppose PLAYER 1 keeps ETB40. That means that PLAYER 1 sends ETB10 to 
PLAYER 2. That amount is multiplied by three, and hence PLAYER 2 receives ETB30. 
PLAYER 2 can then decide whether to send back ETB0, ETB10, ETB20 or ETB30. 
PLAYER 1 then receives the amount he or she kept, ETB40, PLUS the amount PLAYER 
2 sent back to PLAYER 1. PLAYER 2 receives ETB30 MINUS the amount he or she 
sent back to PLAYER 1. 
 Suppose PLAYER 1 keeps ETB20. That means that PLAYER 1 sends ETB30 to 
PLAYER 2. That amount is multiplied by three, and hence PLAYER 2 receives ETB90. 
PLAYER 2 can then decide whether to send back ETB0, ETB30, ETB45, ETB60 or 





PLAYER 2 sent back to PLAYER 1. PLAYER 2 receives ETB90 MINUS the amount he 
or she sent back to PLAYER 1. 
 
As I said, you do not know which role you will play. Therefore, you will be asked to make 
decisions as PLAYER 1 and as PLAYER 2, but only one of the decisions will be carried out for 
real money. After everyone has made their decisions, it is randomly decided whether you will be 
PLAYER 1 or PLAYER 2. If you are assigned the role of PLAYER 1, you are matched with 
another person who has been assigned the role of PLAYER 2.  
 
If you are assigned the role of PLAYER 1, then your total earnings in the game equal the amount 
of money you start out with (ETB50), minus the amount of money you decide to send to 
PLAYER 2, plus the amount of money PLAYER 2 decides to send back to you.  
 
If you are assigned the role of PLAYER 2, you are matched with another person who has been 
assigned the role of PLAYER 1. If you are assigned the role of PLAYER 2, then your total 
earnings in the game equal the tripled amount of money you received from PLAYER 1, minus 
the amount of money you decided to send back to PLAYER 1.  
 
To make sure you understand the game, we will now show with paper money how the game is 
played.  
(The experimenter walks to the middle, takes money out of an envelope and shows them how the 
decision is made, and reminds them that it is going to be tripled when sent by PLAYER 1.) 
Later we will test each of you individually to see whether you understand the game. Only if you 
understand the game will you be allowed to play. If you have any questions, please ask now.  
 
2. Implementation of the game  
We do not know who you will be matched with. The other person may be a CFM member, or 
he or she may not be a member of the CFM. Whom you are playing with may matter for your 
decisions, and hence we ask how much you want to send as PLAYER 1 in case you are 





a moment we will do the same when we ask you for your decisions in case you are assigned 
the role of PLAYER 2. 
 
PLAYER 1: 
1. Suppose you are PLAYER 1 (which means you are given 50 birr)  
(a). How much are you willing to send to PLAYER 2 if PLAYER 2 is a CFM member (0 
10 20 30 40 50)? 
(b). How much are you willing to send to PLAYER 2 if PLAYER 2 is a non-CFM 
member (0 10 20 30 40 50)? 
 
PLAYER 2: 
2. Suppose you are PLAYER 2 and you are returning money from the amount sent to you by 
PLAYER 1.  
Suppose PLAYER 1 is a CFM member; how much are you willing to return if PLAYER 1 
sends you 
 
I. 10 (then we will multiply it by 3) which means that you receive 30. In this case how 
much are you willing to send back (0 10 15 20 30)? 
II. 20 (then we will multiply it by 3) which means that you receive 60. In this case how 
much are you willing to send back (0 20 30 40 60)? 
III. 30 (then we will multiply it by 3) which means that you receive 90. In this case how 
much are you willing to send back (0 30 45 60 90)? 
IV. 40 (then we will multiply it by 3) which means that you receive 120. In this case how 
much are you willing to send back (0 40 60 80 120)? 
V. 50 (then we will multiply it by 3) which means that you receive 150. In this case how 
much are you willing to send back (0 50 75 100 150)? 
 
3. Suppose you are PLAYER 2 and you are returning money from the amount sent to you by 
PLAYER 1.  
Suppose PLAYER 1 is a non-CFM member; how much are you willing to return if PLAYER 
1 sends you 
 
I. 10 (then we will multiply it by 3) which means that you receive 30. In this case how 
much are you willing to send back (0 10 15 20 30)? 
II. 20 (then we will multiply it by 3) which means that you receive 60. In this case how 
much are you willing to send back (0 20 30 40 60)? 
III. 30 (then we will multiply it by 3) which means that you receive 90. In this case how 
much are you willing to send back (0 30 45 60 90)? 
IV. 40 (then we will multiply it by 3) which means that you receive 120. In this case how 





V. 50 (then we will multiply it by 3) which means that you receive 150. In this case how 


































Respondent is CFM member y/n   _______ 
Respondent is matched with partner with Card no. _______ 
Matched with partner that is CFM member y/n _______________ 
Assigned role of respondent (circle it): PLAYER 1    PLAYER 2 
Amount to be sent to CFM _________ 
Amount to be sent to non-CFM_________ 
Amount returned for all possible amounts sent by PLAYER 1 before tripling 
CFM 10        Non-CFM 10        
20  20  
30  30  
40  40  
50  50  
 








Table B1: Endogenous regression of CFM on the amounts sent 
 (1) (2) 
 AmSent1 AmSent2 
   
Age (>25) -0.943 0.605 
 (2.637) (2.085) 
   
Education (#Years>6) 9.264*** 5.421 
 (3.486) (3.311) 
   
House type 3.615 -5.030** 
 (2.592) (2.164) 
   
Income -0.000227 0.000121 
 (0.000499) (0.000440) 
Land size (hectares) -1.493 0.198 
 (1.327) (1.055) 
CFM member=1 12.71** 3.323 
 (6.177) (4.470) 
Village FE YES YES 
Constant 7.659** 8.212*** 
 (3.816) (3.040) 
CFM member=1   
Age (>25) 0.695** 0.695** 
 (0.335) (0.335) 
Education (#Years>6) -0.986*** -0.986*** 
 (0.318) (0.318) 
House type -0.610 -0.610 
 (0.392) (0.392) 
Income -0.0000445 -0.0000445 
 (0.0000777) (0.0000777) 
Land size (hectares) 0.383** 0.383* 
 (0.182) (0.182) 
   
Village FE YES YES 
Constant -0.0713 -0.0814 
 (0.381) (0.381) 
athrho   
Constant -0.642 -0.642 
 (0.404) (0.404) 
Observations 96 96 
   




Participatory Forest Management Achievement in Adaba_Dodola   
S/ 
no 







Area in ha Participant
s 
      





                        
1 Dodola Berisa Berisa 1992 1 6 2645.00 137 21 158 772 
2 Dodola Deneba Danaba 1993 1 15 5479.00 238 65 303 2051 
3 Dodola Bura_Addele Bura-Calle 1995 1 10 3419.00 424 132 556 2981 
4 Dodola Bura_Addele Addelle 1995   12 6159.00 223 81 304 1364 
5 Dodola Kechema Kachema 1998 1 10 2596.00 219 29 248 2010 
6 Dodola Har_Geneta Geneta 1998 1 4 1066.00 91 25 116 544 
7 Dodola H.Daakiyie Hara-Dakiyie 1998 0 7 2791.00 140 40 180 1327 
8 Dodola Keta_berenda WAJIB 1999 1 9 3408.00 191 60 251 1964 
9 Dodola Alentu_dobedo Dobado-kuse 2002 1 10 2812.00 204 87 291 1552 
10 Dodola Alentu_dobedo Hara-Bubftu 2002   10 2776.00 203 85 288 2776 





12 Dodola Aluma_shifa WAJIB 2003 1 6 5049.00 138 42 180 1084 
13 Dodola A.H.kaanku Oda Amba Kanku 2005 1 2 809.00 242 37 279 1953 
14 Dodola Gafarsa-kaarra Gafarsa 2005 1 3 7`65.48 182 62 244 1708 
15 Dodola Morke Silencho Morke 2005 1 7 667.02 137 41 178 1246 
16 Dodola Biqiqaa Burkitu Bikika 2007 1 2 7288.02 156 33 189 1323 
17 Dodola Maqaaliitu Mekalitu Ode 2007 0 1 5606.97 96 20 116 812 





1996 1 7 1886.00 123 26 149 1043 
2 Adaba Bubisa Bubbisaa 
Nageellee 
1996 1 10 8771.00 247 52 299 2093 
3 Adaba Bucha Walta'ii Barii 2002 1 3 1170.00 75 15 90 630 
4 Adaba K-witicho Wiixichoo 1998 1 4 1480.00 93 11 104 728 
5 Adaba Wege Handhura 
Weegee Siree 
2005     8535.00 385 35 420 3780 
6 Adaba Cofra Coofira 
Amaallamaa 
2005     3625.00 206 17 223 2007 
  Adaba Bucha Busooftuu 
Handhuraa 
2003 1 4 1239.00 89 31 120 840 
  Adaba Bubisa Bubbisaa 
Nageellee 





7 Adaba Lenca/washaa Anshuumoo 
Dhagabooraa 
2004 1 4 2889.00 529 16 545 5815 
8 Adaba Koma Qoomaa Abaasaa 2004 1 3 1420.00 461 12 473 3311 
  Adaba Bucha3 Roobee Raayyaa 2005     3947.70 53 9 62 558 
9 Adaba Sole Lodeedoo 
Xaxayeenshoo 
2006     885.40 223 11 234 2106 
10 Adaba Ossee-xonsicho Ossee Xoonsichoo 2007     8494.00         
11 Adaba Gaama wallaallee Gaamaa Gamiroo 2006     11307.00 226 21 247 2223 
    Subtotal     8 38 57629.10 2776 280 3056 25,764 
S/ 
no 







Area in ha Participant
s 
      





1 Kokosa Bokore Bokore 2003 1 7 1215.00 50 5 55 385 
2 Kokosa Dayu Dayu 2003 1 3 72.00 47 4 52 357 
3 Kokosa Kaawo Kaawo 2003 1 5 1784.00 45 6 51 357 
4 Kokosa Wayyo Wayyo 2006 1   255.49         
5 Kokosa Diki Hora Diki Hora 2006 1   95.00         





7 Kokosa Jidha Jidha 2006 1   284.64         
8 Kokosa Garba Hurufa Garba Hurufa 2006 1   251.18         
          8 15 4219.97 142 15 158 1099 
1 Nansabo Huro_Baro Huro_Baro 2002 1 6 1885.00 321 12 333 2331 
2 Nansabo Shambel_Kadir Shambel_Kadir 2002 1 7 2880.00 402 25 427 2989 
3 Nansabo Tulu_Lenca Tulu_Lenca 2002 1 5 1087.00 226 6 232 1624 
4 Nansabo Korema Korema 2003 1 3 588.00 86 2 88 616 
5 Nansabo Mandoyu Mandoyu 2003 1 4 5434.00 108 5 113 791 
6 Nansabo Bulga Bulga 2003 1 2 353.00 98 4 102 714 
7 Nansabo Gerembamo Gerembamo 2003 1 7 12145.00 97 21 118 826 
8 Nansabo Nansabo_chabi Nansabo_chabi 2004 1 3 11259.30 313 2 315 2205 
9 Nansabo Refisa Refisa 2004 1 3 7158.00 176 6 182 1274 
10 Nansabo Melka_Dembi Melka_Dembi 2006 1 2 6748.20 207 7 214 1498 
11 Nansabo Bohera Bohera 2007 1   5034.25 0 0 0 0 
12 Nansabo Habera Habera 2006 1   14760.85 0 0 0 0 
13 Nansabo Gorxe Gorxe 2006 1   20891.00 0 0 0 0 
14 Nansabo Bedesa Bedesa 2007 1   9460.00 0 0 0 0 





16 Nansabo faca'a faca'a 2006 1   14877.13 0 0 0 0 
17 Nansabo Roricho Roricho 2006 1   10127.00 0 0 0 0 
18 Nansabo Riripha Riripha 2006 1   8138.84 0 0 0 0 
19 Nansabo Gata Gata 2007 1   2818.30 0 0 0 0 
  Subtotal 56    139183.1
7 
2034 90 2124 14868 
  Grand total    267579.2
5 






 Total hectares_234,633.3.8ha 
From 1992-1999 (with support of GIZ)_36,3882 ha 
From 2000-2001 (under woreda Agr. office) 0 ha 
From 2002-2005 (under OFWE support) 174,388.10 ha 
REDD+= 75984.9 ha 
(53131.9 ha humid forest + 





APPENDIX 4: Mann-Whitney U test of amount returned by CFM membership 







Share amount returned  
if trustor sends 10 0.405 (0.206) 0.441 (0.238) 0.3205 
if trustor sends 20 0.365 (0.197) 0.442 (0.202) 0.3936 
if trustor sends 30 0.388 (0.210) 0.417 (0.214) 0.2367 
if trustor sends 40 0.384 (0.208) 0.441(0.192) 0.2521 
if trustor sends 50 0.351 (0.193) 0.437 (0.217) 0.0118 
Number of Obs. 62 34  
 Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
APPENDIX 5: 
Table A5: Second mover classification based on return decisions 
  Second Mover behavior when matched with 





Selfish  3 0.03 4 0.04 
Altruist  1 0.01 1 0.01 
Equal Split 5 0.05 4 0.04 
Reciprocal 64 0.67 59 0.61 
Weakly increasing 3 0.03 3 0.03 
Other  20 0.21 24 0.26 
      
  96  96  
Note: If people belong to more than one category they were put in the classification of the order above 






Here the second movers behavior is classified based on the amount they return, and I do this 
separately for returns to CFM members and to non-CFM members. Consider amounts 
returned for all possible amount sent (0, 10, 20, 30, 50, 50) and define the following 
categories of behavior: 
o Selfish: return always 0 
o Altruist: return always amount received (i.e. three times amount sent) 
o Equal split: return always half of the amount received 
o Reciprocal: return at least amount sent 
o Weakly increasing: return non-decreasing amounts: R(X) ≥ R(X-10) where X is 
amount sent increasing 
o Other: any other behavior 
 
The table A5 shows that the huge majority behave in a reciprocal manner, or can 
considered to be conditional cooperators: for any amount sent they return at least that 
amount. This is consistent with results of many trust games. Note, however, that the 
share returned is not increasing in the amount sent (see Table 2 of the main paper). A 
non-substantial fraction also appear to divide the surplus equally (equal split) but the other 
categories are all very small, apart from a rather large group of subjects who display 
behavior that does not fully fall in one of the other categories.  When comparing the results 
for the two cases, the table suggests that pro-social behavior is observed a bit more when a 
player is matched with CFM member, but the differences are small. 
 
 A further examination of above behavioral categories split according to one’s own type 
(CFM membership status) and other player’s type is shown in Table B5. Table B5 shows that 
both CFM and non-CFM members reciprocate more when matched with a CFM member than 
when matched with a non-CFM member. At the same time, the real CFM members are, in 
general, slightly less reciprocal than non-CFM members. 
  
 
Table B5: Second mover classification by decision behavior and CFM membership 
Behavior of second movers matched with CFM 












0  0 0.0588  0.735 
 
0  0.206  
 
34 


















0.0294  0.0882  0.676  0  0.147 
 
34 
Note: If people belong to more than one category they were put in the classification of in the 
order above (e.g altruist are also reciprocal, but are only classified as altruists). 
 
 
